The Arab Spring offered Kurdish political actors in the region significant opportunities to advance their goals. Particularly in Syria and Iraq, Kurdish parties took advantage of the weakening of central governments there. The Kurdish political movement in Turkey, along with its sister movement in Syria, has likewise used the struggle against the “Islamic State” to gain a lot of international sympathy and even support. At the same time, instability in the region has brought increased immediacy to the very real threats faced by Kurdish political actors, whether from hostile central governments or groups such as ISIL.

This article argues that Iran’s “Arab option” – the Arab and pro-Palestinian tilt in Iran’s foreign policy – did not emerge out of the ideological musings of Iran’s Islamic revolutionaries, but out of Iran’s new-found position of preeminence in the later years of the Shah’s rule. The sustainability of Iran’s regional leadership required Arab acceptance and support, which could only be won through a pro-Arab orientation in Iran’s foreign policy.

Since 9/11 and the 2003–2005 terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia, Saudi Shi’a have been variously considered as Iranian agents, terrorists within, apostates, political dissidents, partners in national dialogue, targets of development projects, and aspiring students and citizens. This multiplicity of portrayals suggests that the status and role of Saudi Shi’a fluctuates according to national priorities, domestic, regional, and international political concerns, and fluctuations in the economy. This paper analyzes the interplay between events and trends, on the one hand, and the status and perceptions of Shi’a, on the other, giving attention to both moments of hope, such as the Saudi National Dialogue on dealing with the religious “Other,” the inclusion of Shi’a in the King Abdullah Scholarship Program, and the growing youth activist population creating points of connection and cooperation between Sunnis and Shi’a in social media, and crackdowns, such as during the Arab Spring and the uprising in Bahrain, and concerns about the growing regional influence of Iran in the midst of conflicts in Yemen and Syria. Ultimately, the question is whether Saudi society overall will continue to follow the twin paths of wasatiyya (moderation) and wataniyya (love of nation) declared by former King Abdullah, asserting a supra-national identity uniting otherwise disparate identities, or if regional political instability will result in a resurgence and perpetuation of perceived sectarian strife.

This article argues that anti-Shi’ism is simply one component in a strategy to justify and enforce Egypt’s security policies and regional leadership goals. An examination of Egyptian press coverage of the 2009 discovery of a Hizbullah cell in Egypt illustrates a process through which Shi’ism is initially identified as a sectarian threat, but then “de-Arabized” through linkage with Iran. Despite being an Arab organization, Egyptian media portray Hizbullah as a non-Arab challenge to the Arab world’s stability, more than a Shi’i challenge to Sunnism or a security threat. This indicates that Egypt’s traditional foreign policy of defending Arab interests is more important than sectarianism in conceptualizing threats to its security.

Terrible rulers, sullen populations, a terrorist fringe—the Arabs’ exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral one. Then, a frustrated Tunisian fruit vendor summoned his fellows to a new history, and millions heeded his call. The third Arab awakening came in the nick of time, and it may still usher in freedom.

The paper analyzes the transformations occurred in the two most active and relevant communities in Lebanon after the end of the civil war, namely the Sunni and the Shiites, in the light of Arab uprisings and of the changes in the regional balance of power. If the meta-narrative of the ‘sectarianization’ of the Middle East, especially after 2011, has powered the interpretation of the regional events as marked by the struggle between Sunni and Shiites, the analysis of the transformations of the above mentioned communities in Lebanon and of their impact on the internal and external level, provides one of the best examples against this simplistic representation: the sectarian contraposition is deeply rooted in Lebanon, a pars constituent of its system, but, despite the rhetoric, both communities tend to have more pragmatic and accommodating attitudes instead of exacerbating sectarian confrontation as the afore-mentioned meta-narrative tends to impose. While it is true that each community has witnessed the radicalization of certain positions and that, over the years, major changes are taking place, those have been fuelled by the meta-narrative that is emerging at the regional level and not by a desire to bring the country to the brink of the abyss.