Italian involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936-1939) was perhaps the most explicit example of Rome’s attempt to destabilize London’s position in the Middle East, prior to Italy’s entry to the Second World War. This article examines the mechanisms of Fascist Italy’s assistance to the rebels in Palestine, focusing on the secret contacts between Italian officials and the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. It describes the financial support given by Italy as well as the attempts to smuggle arms to Palestine. The article also analyses Rome’s diplomatic manoeuvres in connection with Palestine and its pro-Arab propaganda. It is argued that Italian policy in Palestine was governed by, and subordinate to, wider considerations of Italian policy such as imperial competition with Great Britain and a desire to increase Italy’s influence in the Middle East. In fact, Fascist involvement in the ‘first Intifada’ teaches us more about Italian foreign policy than it does on the course of events in Palestine during the Arab rebellion.

This paper argues that the purpose of democratization in Jordanian politics is not only a political co-optation policy to cope with the negative effects of the country’s economic recession, but also to ensure the survival of the Hashemite monarchy. The process of democratization in the region has been closely tied with the notions of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. This is due to ‘incomplete’ national identity-building formation in most parts of the Middle East. For that particular purpose, the main objective of this paper is not to re-assert the uniqueness of politics in the Arab world, but rather to engage in how politics of regime survival in the case of Jordan shape the process of democratization in the post – 1989 era. Thus this paper will examine the period following the normalization of relations with Israel in 1994, the Palestinian question, the repercussions of current social upheavals in the Arab world, and how these specific circumstances affect Jordan’s democratic opening.

This article analyzes the Israeli position toward the Arab Peace Initiative (API), which was adopted by the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut. The API has been the most dramatic and progressive Arab initiative ever presented to Israel, and has remained on the negotiating table ever since it was first proposed. Unwilling to recognize the magnitude of the change in the Arab position, succeeding Israeli governments have never officially responded to the initiative for various reasons. The main argument of the article is that by constantly evading the API, Israel has missed a genuine opportunity to advance the peace process.

Since 9/11 and the 2003–2005 terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia, Saudi Shi’a have been variously considered as Iranian agents, terrorists within, apostates, political dissidents, partners in national dialogue, targets of development projects, and aspiring students and citizens. This multiplicity of portrayals suggests that the status and role of Saudi Shi’a fluctuates according to national priorities, domestic, regional, and international political concerns, and fluctuations in the economy. This paper analyzes the interplay between events and trends, on the one hand, and the status and perceptions of Shi’a, on the other, giving attention to both moments of hope, such as the Saudi National Dialogue on dealing with the religious “Other,” the inclusion of Shi’a in the King Abdullah Scholarship Program, and the growing youth activist population creating points of connection and cooperation between Sunnis and Shi’a in social media, and crackdowns, such as during the Arab Spring and the uprising in Bahrain, and concerns about the growing regional influence of Iran in the midst of conflicts in Yemen and Syria. Ultimately, the question is whether Saudi society overall will continue to follow the twin paths of wasatiyya (moderation) and wataniyya (love of nation) declared by former King Abdullah, asserting a supra-national identity uniting otherwise disparate identities, or if regional political instability will result in a resurgence and perpetuation of perceived sectarian strife.