Author
Azmi Bishara
Institution
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
Discipline/Approach...
Abstract
This article was written in response to the violence that took place in Israel during the first two weeks of October 2000. The first phase of these events, from 1 to 6 October, was marked by massive demonstrations in Arab localities throughout Israel in sympathy with the second intifada; in the course of these demonstrations, thirteen unarmed Arab citizens were shot dead by Israeli security forces, a thousand were wounded, and hundreds were arrested. The second phase, from 7 to 15 October, involved vigilante actions by Jewish citizens against Arab citizens, including attacks on mosques, clinics, stores, and homes (see Docs. A5, C1, and D2 in JPS 118, and Docs. C4 and C5 in this issue.) In diagnostic rather than narrative mode, the piece analyzes Israel’s conduct during the events and their repercussions. Its thrust is that Israel’s measures reveal the hollowness of its democracy as far as its Arab citizens are concerned. It equally condemns the Israeli establishment (military and civilian), the Israeli Left, and the “Israelized Arabs” preoccupied with winning the approval of the Jewish majority. Among the main results of the October events, in the author’s view, are the reversal of the trend toward “integration” and the confirmation of the Arab national identity of Israel’s Arab citizens, an identity that is bound to be consolidated as Israel pursues its policies of separation in the occupied territories.
Author
Natana J. DeLong-Bas
Institution
Boston College
Discipline/Approach...
Abstract
Since 9/11 and the 2003–2005 terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia, Saudi Shi’a have been variously considered as Iranian agents, terrorists within, apostates, political dissidents, partners in national dialogue, targets of development projects, and aspiring students and citizens. This multiplicity of portrayals suggests that the status and role of Saudi Shi’a fluctuates according to national priorities, domestic, regional, and international political concerns, and fluctuations in the economy. This paper analyzes the interplay between events and trends, on the one hand, and the status and perceptions of Shi’a, on the other, giving attention to both moments of hope, such as the Saudi National Dialogue on dealing with the religious “Other,” the inclusion of Shi’a in the King Abdullah Scholarship Program, and the growing youth activist population creating points of connection and cooperation between Sunnis and Shi’a in social media, and crackdowns, such as during the Arab Spring and the uprising in Bahrain, and concerns about the growing regional influence of Iran in the midst of conflicts in Yemen and Syria. Ultimately, the question is whether Saudi society overall will continue to follow the twin paths of wasatiyya (moderation) and wataniyya (love of nation) declared by former King Abdullah, asserting a supra-national identity uniting otherwise disparate identities, or if regional political instability will result in a resurgence and perpetuation of perceived sectarian strife.
Author
Mustafa Yetim, Bilal Hamade
Institution
University of Windsor
Discipline/Approach...
Abstract
As the Arab Spring unfolds, a new power configuration is emerging in the Middle East. Turkey is at the center of the new setting, with a fully engaged leadership role that was adopted by the ruling AK Party. In the Levant area, Ankara’s influence is even greater due to Turkey’s full support of the Syrian opposition against the Syrian Baath regime. In this context, it becomes clear that the increasingly involved Turkish role in the region has direct and indirect effects on the stability of countries in the Levant, one of which is Lebanon.
Author
Dalia Dassa Kaye, Frederic Wehrey, Michael Scott Doran
Institution
RAND Corporation, Hudson Institute, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Discipline/Approach...
Abstract
Iran may hope to capitalize on the Arab Spring, write Dalia Kaye and Frederic Wehrey, but Tehran will find the region hard to manipulate. Maybe so, argues Michael Doran—but the United States must still do what it can to counter Iran’s nefarious influence.