Plots of interactions within the Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab domains suggest that a relational analysis of the coming of the Six Day War will require an empirical domain which extends beyond the UAR and Israel. Transformation of the Arab-Israeli domain after 1965 is best described in terms of the degree to which the rising level of conflict became a matter of Syrian-Israeli conflict; UAR-Israeli conflict was negligible during the year prior to mid-May 1967. The inter-Arab domain was transformed from one of cooperation in 1965 to one of conflict and cooperation in 1966-67; during the latter period, conflict and cooperation were distributed in an increasingly bipolar pattern among the “revolutionary” and “conservative” Arab states. The plots of the two domains suggest that conflict between the UAR and the “conservative” Arab states mediated the relationship between the upward trend in Syrian-Israeli conflict and the sudden escalation to war between Israel and the UAR. The data used to generate the plotted streams of targeted conflict and cooperation among Israel, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAR consist of approximately 4500 external events drawn from ten global and regional chronologies and indexes.

Assessing the long-term fallout from the 2003 Iraq War from three perspectives—the state, regional and international—this article argues that the war generated a series of changes that have had a central impact on the political evolution and international relations of the Middle East, though not in the manner anticipated by either its supporters or critics. The war and its consequences, which have become merged with developments surrounding the Arab Spring uprisings, which started at the end of 2010, have contributed over the long term to the acceleration of popular demands for the greater liberalization of politics, to shifts in the regional balance of power and to international realignments. Authoritarian regimes across the region have been increasingly challenged; there are new sectarian divides; Iran has been empowered by the demise of its old rival Saddam Hussein; new ‘pivotal’ states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey have emerged; and western powers have had to review their policy prescriptions and assumptions of regional predominance. The new regional order is both fragile and contested. Taking a long view of the Iraq War on its tenth anniversary is important and relevant to understanding contemporary developments in the region—whether in Syria or elsewhere—and serves to highlight patterns of continuity as well as change. Given the continuing violence and bloodshed in Iraq itself, it also offers some important lessons to regional and external powers about the perils of intervention.

Using Hannah Arendt’s theory as a template, this essay analyzes American foreign policy decisions that led to the Iraq war. Obviously, Arendt would find the misinformation concerning “links” between Iraq and al-Qaeda to be problematic, as well as the unjustified allegation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the Bush administration sought to justify the war in roughly two other ways: the liberation of the people of Iraq from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and the need to stabilize the region by providing a model for democracy in the Middle East. One may wonder whether Arendt would support the administration’s actions for these other reasons, as Arendt was worried about the emergence of nuclear weapons and certainly was against dictatorships in favor of governments that support the public freedom of the people. However, I argue that Arendt’s overall political theory would not support the war and may, in fact, give us reasons to believe that it will not produce a fully functioning democracy in Iraq. In conclusion, I will contrast the Bush administration’s method to the Arab Spring, which Arendt would more fully support, if the outcome focuses on writing and adopting Constitutions that secure freedom for the people involved.