What affects the possibilities and success of opposition cooperation in the Arab world? This piece examines the various contributions to the special issue, highlighting their insights into the types of opposition cooperation prevalent in the region, and the factors that influence the formation, endurance and success of cooperative arrangements. Understanding the structure and dynamics of opposition cooperation, as well as its success and failure, is critical in developing an analytic framework from which to launch further research on the evolving political and sociological realities in the Arab world. Drawing from the contributions in this special issue, this piece concludes by exploring how the uprisings of 2011 are likely to affect cooperation across opposition groups in the future.

On the heels of democratic uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), recent “mass incidents” (qunti shijian) in China have spurred renewed debate about the level of social dissatisfaction and the stability of authoritarian governance in the People’s Republic of China. Yet, unlike in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in the MENA facing widespread rebellion against their ruling regimes, protests in China have not been directed at central political leaders or the political system as a whole. By examining the similarities and differences between Chinese and Middle Eastern authoritarianism, this article seeks to uncover which factors underpin continued public acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party and which ones—if left unchecked—bode ill for the regime.

Throughout the first seven months of the Arab Spring, starting with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, the EU clearly revealed itself as both an actor and spectator by resorting to both activism and passivism in a seemingly erratic fashion. Against this background and based on the EU’s recently adopted Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, this article aims at understanding this dualism more precisely and shedding some light on the EU’s rather anachronistic foreign policy behavior in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in recent months. The article identifies five dichotomies, all of which contribute to the situation in which the EU continues to be torn between being a relevant political actor in the MENA region and a simple spectator that continues to be overwhelmed by local and regional political developments.

Whereas Morocco and Algeria managed to navigate quite calmly through the troubled waters of the Arab Spring, three other North-African countries, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, experienced varying degrees of upheaval. The aim of this study is to highlight the distinct roles played by the armed forces of the latter three states in this tentative political transition by analysing the interests that effectively determined their level of involvement during and after the revolts, postures which in turn impacted on the orientation of this potentially groundbreaking political transformation. The main argument developed in this study is that the three militaries, as a rule, did not side with the revolution per se but acted according to their own institutional interests.

Turkey’s ruling party, AKP, has used foreign policy as one of its primary instruments for consolidating domestic political support and monopolizing power in the hands of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Defiance of Western hegemony and references to the imperial Ottoman past have helped to replace Kemalist narratives and to override growing social divides within the country. As a result, Erdoğan’s hold on power is strengthened, since the AKP’s political contestation has been almost exclusively limited to elections.

Authoritarian regimes learned to fear the rise of the internet because it spurred an online community who encouraged information sharing relatively free from government oversight. However, the West—the creator of the internet—is retreating from openness in cyberspace because of strong arguments made by defense specialists about cyber vulnerabilities and because of cyber meddling by foreign actors, most clearly the Russian Government. This article argues that combatting the rise of authoritarianism, particularly in Russia, requires embracing the strategic advantages openness provides for democracy. The article outlines the ordeal of “cyber rebellions” across the globe and closes with a discussion about the dangers of bowing to pressure to create borders in cyberspace, pointing out that inspiring a retreat from openness is precisely the intent of the authoritarian regimes who most fear it.

It has been 15 years since the last wave of democratization. But as a region, North Africa and the Middle East were noticeably devoid of popular democracy movements—until the early months of 2011. Democratization movements had existed long before technologies like mobile phones and the Internet came to these countries. But with these technologies, people sharing an interest in democracy built extensive networks and activated collective action movements for political change. What might have made regimes more susceptible than others to these uprisings, and what might explain the relative successes of some movements over others? What role does information technology have in the modern recipe for democratization? Weighing multiple political, economic, demographic, and cultural conditions, we find that information infrastructure—especially mobile phone use—consistently appears as one of the key ingredients in parsimonious models for the conjoined combinations of causes behind regime fragility and social movement success. To understand the successes and failures of contemporary political protests, we must also assess how civil society leaders and authoritarian security forces treat communication technologies as democratically consequential.

Middle East experts were as surprised as everyone else by the Arab revolts. Focused on explaining the stability of local autocracries in recent decades, they under-estimated the hidden forces driving change. As they wipe the egg off their faces, they need to reconsider long-held assumptions about the Arab world.

Assessing the long-term fallout from the 2003 Iraq War from three perspectives—the state, regional and international—this article argues that the war generated a series of changes that have had a central impact on the political evolution and international relations of the Middle East, though not in the manner anticipated by either its supporters or critics. The war and its consequences, which have become merged with developments surrounding the Arab Spring uprisings, which started at the end of 2010, have contributed over the long term to the acceleration of popular demands for the greater liberalization of politics, to shifts in the regional balance of power and to international realignments. Authoritarian regimes across the region have been increasingly challenged; there are new sectarian divides; Iran has been empowered by the demise of its old rival Saddam Hussein; new ‘pivotal’ states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey have emerged; and western powers have had to review their policy prescriptions and assumptions of regional predominance. The new regional order is both fragile and contested. Taking a long view of the Iraq War on its tenth anniversary is important and relevant to understanding contemporary developments in the region—whether in Syria or elsewhere—and serves to highlight patterns of continuity as well as change. Given the continuing violence and bloodshed in Iraq itself, it also offers some important lessons to regional and external powers about the perils of intervention.