Recent research on contentious politics in the Middle East emphasizes the importance of repression and its effect on social movements, often manifested in demobilization and so-called ‘nonmovements’. This case study of West Bank Palestinian activism seeks to go beyond such outcomes. The current, youthful nonviolent Palestinian grassroots activism in the West Bank is persistent, despite repeated violent repression. Focusing on the interplay between context, practices, and networks, this article shows how an increasingly vocal and visible popular resistance movement has asserted itself despite facing double repression – from the occupying Israeli state and the Palestinian National Authority. In a highly repressive context characterized by widespread demobilization, especially among young people, the impetus for mobilization is not perceived opportunity, but rather existential threats. The analysis focuses on how long-term repression from the external occupier and the internal elite contributes to forming specific kinds of contentious practices and networks among young Palestinian grassroots activists. By deploying new and creative contentious tactics they partly succeed in challenging the Israeli occupation without risking sanctions from the internal Palestinian elite. They are also able to criticize this elite implicitly, bringing popular pressure to bear on it. However, while the strategic use of nonviolence has provided these activist environments with a degree of resilience in the face of repression, they are unable to mobilize on a wide scale as long as the Palestinian political elite does not support them.
This short presentation is a preliminary analysis of the factors, incidences, and possible spread and outcomes of the ‘Arab Spring’ that has just unfolded. It is based on recent relevant literature, media reports, and different political analyses. In particular, it is benefitted from two major works that I am completing (as the principal researcher and editor) on all 47 Muslim majority countries in Africa and Asia: The Muslim World in the 21st century: Space, Power, and Human Development, Springer, forthcoming; and Philanthropy and Human Security in Muslim Majority Countries, Springer, forthcoming. The presentation, in seven sections, suggests that owing to the fundamental (economic, political, and social) differences the countries in North Africa and West Asia are highly unlikely to witness similar exposure to or outcomes of the youth e-activism (‘social media’ facilitated youth-led spontaneous grass-roots online and street organizing for socio-political change). Tunisia (for an enlightened liberal leadership and no-tribal politics) is likely to have some positive outcomes, Egypt (due to an aspiring army) may falter and support status-quo, Libya and Yemen (for possible tribal conflicts) are likely to face unwanted failed consequences. The youth e-activism may not take-off or have different outcomes in the West Asian countries, primarily because of low organizational density as well as for the social structure, political system, and (re)distributive mechanism. There are also issues of international political economy, and self-preserving tribe-based ‘spoils’ system (blessed by petroleum politics), and a lack of membership organizations. Due to the above factors and a lower level of internet penetration and social media connectivity, the oil rich Gulf states are unlikely to board the current wave of youth activism and be affected by the ‘Spring’, any way. So there may not be an Arab Spring, at all.