International law lacks the coherence that domestic law has. There is no world parliament, and judicial decisions, albeit binding, are not always respected. States seem to largely enjoy the discretion to shape international law according to their volition. Yet, quite paradoxically, and albeit not confined by any outer restraints, states feel inherently limited in their actions.

The present article would like to trace these inherent limits of international law. In order to do this, the article will use a paradigm that constitutes the awarding platform for all other human rights: the right to self-determination.

The article will examine the restrictions imposed to self-determination quests, comparing in the realms of the Arab spring, the stance of the international community towards Libya and Syria. Activist in the first case, more passive in the second, the recoil of the international community in assisting people to achieve their quests for internal self-determination is a direct consequence of international law’s inherent limits. Tracing them, the article will then focus on the practical implications these limits’ cognizance has for international law and international thematic constitutionalism.