Law and Jurisprudence
Civil conflict appears to be contagious—scholars have shown that civil wars in a state’s neighborhood make citizens more likely to rebel at home. However, war occurs when both rebels and the state engage in conflict. How do state authorities respond to the potential for civil conflict to spread? We argue that elites will anticipate the incentive-altering effects of civil wars abroad and increase repression at home to preempt potential rebellion. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model and spatially weighted conflict measures, we find robust evidence that a state will engage in higher levels of human rights violations as civil war becomes more prevalent in its geographic proximity. We thus find evidence that states violate rights as a function of the internal politics of other states. Further, we argue authorities will act not to mimic their neighbors but rather to avoid their fate.
The fundamental question of whether or not the Green Movement’s opposition leaders were successful in their attempts to change the political landscape in Iran first lies in understanding the premise behind the organization and secondly recognizing the actual goals of the leadership. Consequently, this article analyzes these questions as a framework for developing a comparative analysis between revolutions and civil rights movements as a means to understand both the intent and outcomes of the Green Movement. From this analysis, lessons learned are put forth as a means to establish a series of recommendations for future Western political engagements with Iran. In doing so, the hope is that a political dialogue will emerge between Western governments that both alleviate the current tensions while also addressing security concerns in the region.
This article examines the rarely talked about subtleties of Moroccan reform in the realm of women’s rights and its inadequate fulfillment of obligations to international human rights standards. The Preamble to Morocco’s post-Arab Spring 2011 constitution follows the example of its 1996 version, in which the state declared its “determination to abide by the universally recognised human rights.” However, while the state is often hailed in the international forums and media as a true trendsetter in the realm of women’s rights in the Middle East and North Africa region, this analysis of the much celebrated Family Code and its two main goals-“doing justice to women” and “preserving men’s dignity”-and of the regime’s ambivalent discourse on gender equality as defined by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) paints a more realistic picture. Both of these cases indicate that the state is failing to ameliorate the legal position of women and to consider women as autonomous and individual human beings with intrinsic rights not contingent upon first fulfilling their customary obligations. I contend, therefore, that the way the reformed Family Code has formulated its goals and the way that the law and the state continue to conceptualize a woman go against the main principle of individuality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and CEDAW to which Morocco has continually committed itself, at least on paper.
The author emphasizes the self-determination of local actors who must struggle on their own terms, and the internal dynamics of how rebellions may evolve into transformative revolutions over time. Regarding the outcomes of 2011 rebellions across the Arab world the author proposes engaging Islamists in open political contestation, within the same constitutional and democratic framework that apply to all citizens. The article focuses on the mediation of tensions in this relationship between Sharia (the normative system of Islam) and the post-colonial state through the separation of Islam and the state, while affirming and regulating the connectedness of Islam and politics.
The present paper examines the issue of accountability for Muslim Heads of State in the context of the Arab Revolutions. It reviews the efforts that have already been undertaken to hold leaders responsible and suggests that the Arab Uprising has represented a unique opportunity to establish democracy and end the culture of impunity in the Arab world.
Though Egyptian voters clearly evince a desire for Islamic law (however defined), public opinion research shows that they also want robust welfare states and significant redistribution. Though the application of Islamic law is the special province of Islamist parties, it is left-leaning, labor-based parties who are the primary champions of the economic policies that Egyptians seem to desire. Why, then, do Egyptian voters select the former over the latter? This article argues that the answer lies not in the political unsophistication of voters, the subordination of economic interests to spiritual ones, or the bureaucratic and organizational shortcomings of leftist parties, but in the ways in which the social landscape shapes the opportunities of parties in newly democratized systems to reach potential voters. Dense networks of religious solidary organizations, in which Islamist activists are often embedded, and which encompass large numbers of voters, provide Islamist parties with opportunities for linkage that are unavailable to leftists, who are embedded in much more limited networks of labor activism. As a result, despite the fact that Islamist attitudes toward redistribution and the state’s role in providing welfare are more ambiguous than those of leftists, Islamist candidates have far greater opportunities to convince voters that they in fact share their economic views. The theory is tested with a combination of aggregate and individual evidence from Egypt after the Arab Spring.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, since 2011, the Syrian conflict has generated roughly 5.4 million refugees, while approximately 6.5 million people are internally displaced within the country, making it the largest internally displaced population in the world. Rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure, homes, and businesses will be an immense task, with cost estimates ranging between $250–$350 billion USD. The Syrian government and the international community have already started to contemplate postwar reconstruction and even wartime reconstruction, despite the ongoing fighting. This Note operates under the assumption that the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad will, at a minimum, remain in charge of at least what has been termed “Useful Syria.” Furthermore, it recognizes that reconstruction is a process that begins during war and that the notion that Syria will be able to implement a grand, centralized reconstruction project after the war’s cessation is an unrealistic paradigm. It is imperative, then, that policymakers, negotiators, and lawmakers representing Syria’s warring parties debate and negotiate existing Syrian domestic law, which appears likely to persist in some form, in order to anticipate and accommodate the rights of displaced Syrians and Syrian refugees.
A proper investigation of the obstacles to Syrian refugees’ achievement of appropriate post-conflict relief and housing restitution necessitates an understanding of the flaws in Housing, Land, and Property rights in prewar Syria. Rapid urbanization and the proliferation of informal housing spurred by neo-liberal government policies led to massive discontent in the country.
This Note analyzes the Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (“Pinheiro Principles”) and argues that while they provide valuable contributions to an increased understanding of the needs of post-conflict societies, room may be allotted to tailor a more context-specific approach to remedying the rights of displaced Syrian persons and refugees. This Note proceeds to analyze and prescribe amendments and additions to existing Syrian domestic law so that it better conforms to the end goals of the Pinheiro Principles. Syria’s Local Administrative Law, Legislative Decree Law 107, if amended to democratize the institution of the Syrian governorship, could be an effective starting point that presents decentralization as a pivotal tool to empower sustainable reconstruction efforts for refugees and displaced persons. Its incorporation, alongside an amended version of Syria’s Public-Private Partnership Law, Legislative Decree Law 5, could safeguard against abuses directed against refugees’ and displaced persons’ rights under the Pinheiro Principles, strengthen ordinary Syrians’ voices in the deliberations concerning their country’s bottom-up reconstruction, and enhance and strengthen demoralized and underdeveloped local Syrian institutions.
In the aftermath of massive human rights misuses, victims have well-established rights to see the culprits penalized, to know the truth, and to receive reparations. Because systemic human rights transgressions touch not just the direct victims, but the entire society, states have obligations to guarantee that the defilements will not reoccur, and thus, a distinctive duty to reform institutions that were either involved in or incapable of averting the mistreatments. Academic scholars and activists cited that the core elements of a comprehensive Transitional Justice (“TJ”) strategy include criminal prosecutions and trials, principally those that address perpetrators considered to be the most accountable. Compensations (repressions), through which governments identify and take steps to address the injuries suffered. Such initiatives often have substantial components, as health services/cash payments as well as emblematic features, as public apologies or memorialization (day of remembrance). Furthermore, institutional reform of offensive state institutions such as the military, police enforcements, and judicial bodies (courts), to dismantle appropriately the operational machinery of manipulations and preclude reappearance of grave human rights abuses and impunity along with the Truth Commissions or other techniques to investigate and report on systematic patterns of exploitation, recommend changes and reforms in that field.
It should be noted that footsteps that must be taken in TJ should comprise peace process; renovation of institutions that are favorable to a stable and fair political system, including governance and judicial configurations; the procurement of the economic means required to achieve those ends, as economic stability is instrumental for political constancy, and the reinstatement of civil confidence (trust) in government’s institutions, means that the state works for all citizens irrespective of race, gender, nationality, religion, or political allegiance. Legally speaking, it is a combination of International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”), International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”), along with the due process principles in criminal prosecutions. This process proposed justice in all its forms, includes restorative justice, criminal justice, redistributive and social justices. This article will discuss TJ roots in religious perspectives generally in section two and if it is compatible with the recent positive international norms along with the TJ model in Islamic law in part three, highlighting Egypt as a case study regarding the death penalty as a tool of TJ. Finally it concludes that the axiomatic view of Islamic TJ policies is in essence fashioned by religious theories, laws, and divine practices and that Islam is more than appropriate to create a comprehensive design for victims’ care in transitional periods on both national and universal levels. This is a message that everyone can and must understand.
An accurate and thoughtful understanding of the Islamic perception of the essential rights of elderly Muslims that considers the substantial contemporary fluctuations and adaptations of their cultural, economic, social, and emotional necessities, evolutions, and renovations calls for attention to Shari‘a (Islamic) principles and religious norms. It should be noted that a socio-cultural framework based on Islamic ideals is considered a crucial feature of Arab and Middle Eastern regions in the shaping of their political and legal support systems. In light of Islamic philosophies and code of ethics, the family remains the keystone for the sustenance of the elderly; placing the elderly, especially parents, in nursery homes or similar places is prohibited, as it represents a direct transgression of the divine Law of God. However, family unity cannot be assumed to be secure, given the new demographic and economic realities.
Based on this succinct backdrop regarding the interconnection between Islam and elderly care, this article examines what Islamic elder and human rights laws propose for the needs of the elderly. Part one briefly reviews theological concepts (discourse) on ageing and old age. Part two discusses the maintenance of the elderly (parents) and their essential rights according to Islamic theory. Part three highlights an action plan (or model) for the future regional strategy on treating the elderly in Muslim countries where positive law fails or otherwise cannot insure the basic care required by Islamic law, and by vital international human rights instruments. This section will track how Shari‘a law and reasoning in this arena can be a more fruitful alternative. Finally, the paper offers conclusions on how the axiomatic view of Islamic elder law is, in essence, fashioned by religious theories, laws, and divine practice, via a critical discussion of these Islamic principles. Ultimately, I will contend that Islam constitutes an appropriate and comprehensive design for the care of elderly people, so much so that national statutes should strive to meet its criteria.