In the aftermath of massive human rights misuses, victims have well-established rights to see the culprits penalized, to know the truth, and to receive reparations. Because systemic human rights transgressions touch not just the direct victims, but the entire society, states have obligations to guarantee that the defilements will not reoccur, and thus, a distinctive duty to reform institutions that were either involved in or incapable of averting the mistreatments. Academic scholars and activists cited that the core elements of a comprehensive Transitional Justice (“TJ”) strategy include criminal prosecutions and trials, principally those that address perpetrators considered to be the most accountable. Compensations (repressions), through which governments identify and take steps to address the injuries suffered. Such initiatives often have substantial components, as health services/cash payments as well as emblematic features, as public apologies or memorialization (day of remembrance). Furthermore, institutional reform of offensive state institutions such as the military, police enforcements, and judicial bodies (courts), to dismantle appropriately the operational machinery of manipulations and preclude reappearance of grave human rights abuses and impunity along with the Truth Commissions or other techniques to investigate and report on systematic patterns of exploitation, recommend changes and reforms in that field.

It should be noted that footsteps that must be taken in TJ should comprise peace process; renovation of institutions that are favorable to a stable and fair political system, including governance and judicial configurations; the procurement of the economic means required to achieve those ends, as economic stability is instrumental for political constancy, and the reinstatement of civil confidence (trust) in government’s institutions, means that the state works for all citizens irrespective of race, gender, nationality, religion, or political allegiance. Legally speaking, it is a combination of International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”), International Human Rights Law (“IHRL”), along with the due process principles in criminal prosecutions. This process proposed justice in all its forms, includes restorative justice, criminal justice, redistributive and social justices. This article will discuss TJ roots in religious perspectives generally in section two and if it is compatible with the recent positive international norms along with the TJ model in Islamic law in part three, highlighting Egypt as a case study regarding the death penalty as a tool of TJ. Finally it concludes that the axiomatic view of Islamic TJ policies is in essence fashioned by religious theories, laws, and divine practices and that Islam is more than appropriate to create a comprehensive design for victims’ care in transitional periods on both national and universal levels. This is a message that everyone can and must understand.

Authoritarian regimes hold elections not to democratize, but to maintain the status quo. Egypt is no exception. As far back as the 1970s, Egypt’s multiparty electoral system has been a democratic façade. As President Anwar Sadat shifted Egypt’s external alliance from the Soviet Union to the United States and marginalized Abdel Nasser’s socialist base, he proclaimed his commitment to political liberalization. In holding Egypt’s first multiparty elections – albeit tightly controlled through an electoral scheme that always guaranteed his party’s victory – Sadat transitioned Egypt from one party into multiparty electoral authoritarianism.

The neoliberal business class would dominate Egypt’s political elite for the next forty years, with the military holding sway behind the scenes. In exchange for loyalty to the authoritarian state, this neoliberal elite was allowed to siphon off state resources. Elections became the elite’s mechanism for rent seeking. As such, parliamentarians had privileged access to government ministries to expediently obtain licenses, permits, and public contracts for themselves and their constituents. They engaged in corruption while immune from criminal prosecution due to their elected official status. An interdependency thus arose between the political elite and the executive. President Hosni Mubarak continued Sadat’s legacy with a few key differences. The most important being that the influence of the military in political affairs waned as domestic security forces became the primary coercive arm of the authoritarian state. Moreover, Mubarak pruned his son Gamal to become the next president, and as a result, elevated Gamal’s business cronies to key executive and legislative positions. Over time, the military, while still a key political stakeholder, was marginalized from the center of power.

This Article argues that the current regime under President Abdel Fatah Sisi has established a military electoral authoritarian state with a non-dominant party electoral system. Coupled with Egypt’s long tradition of nepotism, cronyism, and patronage networks, the new election laws perpetuate a fragmented, depoliticized parliament wherein no mobilized opposition can take shape to challenge the military’s dominance. The cause of Egypt’s current depoliticization, however, is not a weak central party beholden to the presidency – as was the case under Sadat and Mubarak – but rather hundreds of rent-seeking parliamentarians with no party affiliation. Sisi intentionally structured the parliament to consist of over four hundred individual, self-interested actors who are vulnerable to bribery or coercion to keep them depoliticized and compliant. This strategy facilitates purging any parliamentary figures that emerge to challenge the executive.