This book is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal government, which is why they are reproduced differently. The book argues that alternative pathways of SUR continuity result first and foremost from the capacity (or lack thereof) of democratic presidents to wield power over SURs and autocrats. If presidents have the (fiscal or partisan) resources to induce cooperation from subnational autocrats and can thus secure credible and routine political support, the former have strong incentives to invest in the continuity and stability of undemocratic provincial regimes and autocrats. Under these circumstances, SUR reproduction from above takes place. Conversely, if presidents fail to exert effective power and are prevented from disciplining subnational autocrats via fiscal or partisan means, they will implement policies to oppose and weaken SURs. This does not necessarily lead to SUR breakdown. Local variables, such as subnational autocrats’ capacity to ensure party elite unity and/or mass political support, shape autocrats’ ability to counterbalance presidential attempts at destabilization, and also allow autocrats to keep their regimes alive. Where this occurs, SUR self-reproduction takes place. This explanation of SUR continuity is tested in contemporary Argentina and Mexico using a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as cross-national and within-country comparisons, are employed to test pathways of SUR continuity in two of Latin America’s largest countries.
Civil conflict appears to be contagious—scholars have shown that civil wars in a state’s neighborhood make citizens more likely to rebel at home. However, war occurs when both rebels and the state engage in conflict. How do state authorities respond to the potential for civil conflict to spread? We argue that elites will anticipate the incentive-altering effects of civil wars abroad and increase repression at home to preempt potential rebellion. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model and spatially weighted conflict measures, we find robust evidence that a state will engage in higher levels of human rights violations as civil war becomes more prevalent in its geographic proximity. We thus find evidence that states violate rights as a function of the internal politics of other states. Further, we argue authorities will act not to mimic their neighbors but rather to avoid their fate.
The use of violent coercion to repress unarmed protests, such as that seen during the Arab Spring, sometimes backfires on the government – an outcome called ‘political jiu-jitsu’. Examining unique global data covering extreme violence used by governments against unarmed protests from 1989 to 2011 (drawn from UCDP) and the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data, this study aims to explain the conditions under which this outcome occurs. This study contributes to both the nonviolent action and one-sided violence literatures by further disaggregating this effect into both domestic and international outcomes, a distinction that has not previously been made in empirical studies. We find evidence that a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and security defections after violent repression, but is unrelated to international backlash. Within ongoing NAVCO campaigns we find that parallel media institutions increase the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and international repercussions after repression, and that this effect holds true for both traditional media and ‘new’ (i.e. internet-based) media. One of the novel contributions of this study is that we identify an important selection effect in the NAVCO data and the critical role of organizational infrastructure, especially communications infrastructure, in generating preference changes that create the conditions where killing unarmed civilians becomes costly for repressive governments. We conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of this study and avenues for future research.
This investigation identifies the different elements in Bahraini society and government that indicate the existence of authoritarian rule and the mechanisms which perpetuate it. Hardliners in the royal family have strategically obstructed democratization in the country by controlling Bahrain’s ideological and coercive state apparatus. The ideological apparatus encourages public disavowal of political reform and marginalizing Bahrain’s Shī’ī heritage. The coercive state apparatus regularly punishes, imprisons, and physically abuses political activists and those who are suspected of encouraging civil unrest. Bahrain’s alliance with Saudi Arabia has encouraged hardliners in the government to particularly promote anti-Shī’ī agendas that stigmatize, disenfranchise, and repress the majority of its citizens. Representatives of the Bahraini government have consistently accused Iran of providing logistical support to Bahraini activists. However, evidence suggests the claims of Iranian involvement in the 2011 demonstrations or an alleged coup attempt in 1981 to be false. Finally, this article identifies developments in 2011, both inside and outside of the country, that encouraged the reduction of repression of its citizens.
Commentators covering recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring, have claimed that cell phones and social media enable collective action. We develop a theoretical model to illustrate why, focusing on two mechanisms: first, by enabling communication among would-be protesters, cell phones lower the costs of coordination; second, these technologies broadcast information about whether a protest is repressed. Knowing that a large audience will now witness, and may be enraged by repression, governments refrain from squashing demonstrators, lowering the cost of protesting. We evaluate the model’s predictions using high-resolution global data on the expansion of cell phone coverage and the incidence of protest from 2007-2014. Our difference-in-differences estimates indicate that cell phone coverage increases the probability of protest by two times the mean. Consistent with our second mechanism, we also find that the expansion of coverage reduces the probability of repression.
The aim of this paper is to provide a specific point of view on the protests that have characterized the Arab countries from December 2010 and are still going on. To understand some of the reasons behind these events, I propose a sequential game with asymmetric information on the likelihood of having a successful uprising. This means that on one hand the government choices may signal the true state of nature and on the other hand the citizens’ choices are a way to learn the truth. The model is simple and I assume specific parameters’ values to obtain a full characterization of the set of equilibria. This full characterization shows the interaction of three main factors in determining the possible resulting political regimes: the country’s wealth, the autocratic institutions and the general political mood. The complex interaction of these three variables explain why apparently heterogeneous countries may have similar political processes and apparently similar countries have different political situations.
The Arab Spring has led to very different outcomes across the Arab world. I present a highly stylized model of the Arab Spring to better understand these differences. In this model, dictators from the ethnic or religious majority group concede power if their country is oil-poor, but can stay in power by bribing the people if their country is oil-rich. Dictators from the minority group often rely on other members of their group to repress protests and to fight the majority group if necessary. These predictions are consistent with observed outcomes in Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and elsewhere.