In response to the 2011 Tunisian elections and the uncertainty surrounding Tunisia’s future, we offer an empirical explanation of the election’s results using socioeconomic and demographic variables. We aggregate many political analyses to describe the main parties and give insights into their strengths and weaknesses. We also examine common misconceptions advanced during the elections. Finally, we include a proposed electoral map that could be used by politicians to plan their future political strategies.
This paper develops an agent-based computational model of violent political revolution in which a subjugated population of agents and an armed revolutionary organization try to overthrow a central authority and its loyal forces. The model replicates several patterns of rebellion consistent with the major historical revolutions and provides an explanation for the multiplicity of outcomes that can arise from an uprising. This last point is of particular interest if we consider the heterogeneity of political outcomes produced by the recent revolutionary episodes in the so-called Arab Spring.
This paper examines the role of social media in progressive political change, in light of its use in the Arab Spring uprisings. The concept of social media us explained, before arguments for and against the importance of social media in revolutions (eg those of Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky) are examined. An account of the Arab Spring (to date) is then given, including the apparent role of social media. Evgeny Morozov’s arguments are then outlined, including his contentions that social media and the internet can be tools of oppression rather than emancipation, and spreaders of hate and propaganda rather than tolerance and democracy. The US policy on internet freedom is critiqued too. Finally, the role of social media companies, and their accountability and responsibility given their (perhaps inadvertant) role as the facilitators of revolution, is discussed.
This article claims that the revolutions in the Arab world foster insight into more than the spread of liberalism. Fukuyama’s end of history has not just reached the Muslim world faster than expected. These revolutions show that strong religion and liberal democracy are compatible: they are postsecular revolutions. As already the revolutions of 1989 proved in some respect, in contrast to the secular ideals of the French Revolution, revolution and religion can go hand in hand in a postsecular way. Praying and making revolution does not need to end in a religious autocracy as 1979 in Iran. Religious citizens stood up praying for democracy and the rule of law against secular regimes which legitimised themselves as a bulwark against sinister forces of religion. Analysing the revolutions of 1989, Jürgen Habermas speaks of ‘catching-up revolutions’ which brought nothing new to the course of history. Yet after 9/11 he started to develop his idea of a postsecular society in which secular and religious citizens are equally entitled to make their arguments in a public sphere. Criticising the early Habermas with the later, the article argues that the postsecular revolutions of 1989 and 2011 are preparing the ground for a postsecular democracy.