Computational
The five approaches outlined in this book offers the systems thinking practitioner a range of interchangeable tools for pro-actively making systemic improvements amidst complex situations of change and uncertainty. Practitioners from all professional domains are increasingly confronted with incidences of systemic failure, yet poorly equipped with appropriate tools and know-how for understanding such failure, and the making of systemic improvement. In our fragile Anthropocene world where ‘systems change’ is often invoked as the rallying call for purposeful alternative action, this book provides a toolkit to help constructively make systems that can change situations for the better. Systems Approaches offers an excellent introduction for those seeking to understand systems thinking and to enact systems thinking in practice. The book helps practitioners from all professions to better understand inter-relationships, engage with multiple perspectives, and reflect on boundary judgements that can inhibit or enhance improved purposeful change. After an editorial introduction to these systems thinking in practice capabilities, successive chapters illustrate five systems approaches, each chosen for having a rigorous though adaptable framework, and a robust long pedigree of application in complex situations. Each chapter illustrates what the approach is about, followed by invaluable tips and insights from experience regarding how the tools might be practiced. Amongst updates from originating authors for this 2nd edition, each approach has an accompanying postscript on some developments since the 1st edition.
A debate has emerged whether countries with Muslim majorities are intrinsically more likely to be autocratic. Recent studies have traced this to the allegedly repressive nature of Islam. This article replicates the most recent study on this topic, published in Public Choice (Potrafke in Public Choice 151:185–192, 2012), and demonstrates that the effect is not robust to a number of sensible alterations to the statistical specification. The effect between Islam and democracy is spurious. There is no causal relationship between Islam and democracy.
This paper discusses the data limitations associated with the measurement of top incomes and inequality in the Middle East, with special emphasis to the case of Egypt. It has been noted that high inequality might have contributed to the Arab spring revolt movement. Some studies have argued however that measured inequality in Middle East countries is not particularly large by international standards, and that popular discontent mostly reflects the perceived level of inequality, and the perceived (un)fairness of the distribution. In this paper we review the evidence and present new estimates. We come with two main conclusions. First, data sources at the national level are insufficient to derive reliable estimates of top income shares in a country like Egypt(or in other Middle East countries). One would need reliable fiscal sources in order to make a precise comparison with other emerging or developed countries. Unfortunately, such sources are lacking in most of the region. Next, and irrespective of these uncertainties on within-country inequalities, there is no doubt that income inequality is extremely large at the level of the Middle East taken as whole-simply because regional inequality in per capita GNP is particularly large. According to our benchmark estimates, the share of total Middle East income accruing to the top 10% income receivers is currently 55% (vs.48% in the United States,36% in Western Europe, and 54% in South Africa). Under plausible assumptions, the top 10% income share could be well over 60%, and the top 1% share might exceed 25% (vs. 20% in the United States,11% in Western Europe, and 17% in South Africa). Popular discontent might reflect the fact that perceptions about inequality and the (un)fairness of the distribution are determined by regional (and/or global) inequality, and not only on national inequality.
The study aimed to identify the media consumption patterns of the Arab Spring revolutions from the viewpoint of Yarmouk University students. In addition to detect whether there is a statistically significant differences at the level of significance (α = 0.05) with respect to the views of respondents regarding employing the study dimensions related to political, military and human dimension due to the variables of the study (sex, educational qualification). The study sample consisted of Yarmouk University students (200) students. The descriptive analytical method was used, through which the following results were concluded: 1. Identifying the media consumption patterns on the Arab Spring. 2. No statistically significant differences at the level of significance (α = 0.05) with respect to the views of respondents about media consumption patterns of the Arab Spring due to the variable of sex. 3. There are no statistically significant differences at the level of significance (α = 0.05) with respect to the views of respondents about media consumption patterns around of Arab Spring due to the educational qualification variable. Based on the results of the theoretical and empirical study, the researcher suggests the following: Identify the mechanisms through which media networks broadcast the political propaganda related to the political, military and human dimensions, and the procedures used to do so. Also studying the methods by which the propaganda messages are being broadcast and analyzed, and employing them for the public interest. In addition to analyzing the means by which the propaganda messages are sent whether they are political or other, with focusing on the procedures used to publish them. Finally, identifying the media mechanisms to dedicate the phenomenon of political propaganda based on honesty and objectivity in the media work.
As integration is related to systemic risk and rewards in the stock markets, it is coupled with both weak and semi-strong forms of efficiency. Little evidence is found on return and volatility spillover within the Muslim country markets. This study investigates if the Muslim majority countries are interconnected with each other through returns and volatility spillovers among the stock markets for the span of about twenty years from July 1996 to February 2016. Vector Autoregressive (VAR) method as applied by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) has been used to find the static and dynamic spillover indices of nine countries with religious similarity in 80% of the population and their three developed counterparts. We found overall significant spillovers; returns connectedness was 36.5% and volatility connectedness 22.4%. The study did not find any outright integration or evidence of spillover from developed markets to the Muslim majority group. However, US and Japan caused returns and volatility shocks respectively. In dynamic analysis, both returns and volatility spillover showed a gentle and stable increase in integration. Moreover, volatility spillover responded not only to the major global financial crises but also to the Arab Spring. These findings have major implications for diversified investment in the global financial market.
This paper uses Synthetic Control Methodology to estimate the output loss in Tunisia as a result of the “ArabSpring.” The results suggest that the loss was 5.5 percent, 5.1 percent, and 6.4 percent of GDP in 2011, 2012, and 2013 respectively. These findings are robust to a series of tests, including placebo tests, and are consistent with those from an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model of Tunisia’s economic growth. Moreover, this paper finds that investment was the main channel through which the economy was adversely impacted by the Arab Spring.
Corruption provokes much anger in MENA and was important as a trigger in the Arab Uprisings it was government corruption that sparked the greatest anger among the population. The argument of this Report is (a) that government corruption is a major and obvious breach of trust, (b) that the same is true for ‘civil’ corruption – ‘wasta’ in employment, business corruption – and (c) that corruption is a special case of breach of the Rule of Law which is essential for a decent society. The initial focus on corruption leads to consideration of what people think they can reasonably expect from government and from each other. Ultimately, corruption breaks the cords that hold modern societies together; it is an attack on social cohesion.
The MENA countries have some way to go before much social cohesion is achieved. While three quarters or even more would trust their neighbours and people known to them personally, 70 per cent (83% in Tunisia) say other people are generally not to be trusted and a third or more consider that others would take advantage of you rather than try to be fair. More than a third of respondents think every level of government is corrupt (except in Tunisia, but even there the figure is around 16%), and where we have the detailed information we find that between 13 and 35 per cent think all or most of the politicians, the tax officials and even the judges are corrupt. Over half the population, and in some countries three quarters, think the government is doing little or nothing to remedy this. Beyond monetary corruption, wasta is very influential in the allocation of jobs, and if you do not know the right people and are not known by them you will have difficulty finding a job, which is profoundly divisive. ‘Crony capitalism’ may be seen as a high-level governmental version of the same process, with business opportunities and advantages reserved for the friends of government. Over 60 per cent in most countries trust the police and the army, but this still leaves a substantial minority who do not have trust in them, and only half the population trust even the courts (varying from 63% in Egypt and 57% in Jordan to 28% in Morocco and 31% in Tunisia).
However, there are signs that at least an understanding of what is required for cohesion underlies this disaffection. In the three countries covered by the AfroBarometer for this period over 80 per cent in Egypt and over 90 per cent in Tunisia agree that the decisions of the courts are binding, for example, and that people must obey the law (but 64% and 71% respectively in Morocco); some of them merely ‘agree’ rather than ‘agree strongly’, but the distinction may be a question of passion versus simple acceptance. Around 80 per cent agree that people must pay their taxes in Egypt and Tunisia, and 67 per cent in Morocco. The fundamentals of the Rule of Law – that laws must be obeyed by everyone equally and the decisions of the courts are binding on everyone equally – would therefore appear to have a place in MENA governmental discourse.
Of particular interest in this context is the ways in which people in the MENA region define what they mean by ‘democracy’. There is every indication in the ArabTrans survey that a substantial group of the population in each country want what they see as ‘democracy’ – at least a third in most countries, towards half in Tunisia and more than half in Iraq. However, ‘democracy’ tends to be defined in terms not of elections and the ballot box alone but as showing the characteristics of a decent society. Doing away with corruption was chosen as a defining characteristic of democracy by between 20 and 40 per cent of respondents; other popular choices were economic ones (the availability of basics and of jobs) at a similar level, ‘equality’ items (political or economic), and freedom to criticise government.
The point to be made is that trust, detestation of corruption and wasta, the desire for free speech, the wish to be recognised as an equal of others politically and to have the resources to live the same lives as other people are not separate goals but in some sense facets of a single desired life style. People want a society where they are treated as adults, with dignity and respect, have a say in their lives and are as free to develop their capabilities as is compatible with the same freedom being offered to everyone else. Where the behaviour of the powerful – whether members of an elite or those with a small and temporary power – is blatantly aimed at the advantage of self or in-group, this forces reappraisal of the underlying cohesive norms that make a society possible.
In the wake of a dramatic political change, such as the so-called “Arab Spring”, the associated ramifications on the stock markets, especially the regional ones, are questionable. This study examines the impact of the Arab spring on the returns and volatility of a financial market in a stable neighboring country. Specifically, we contribute to the extant literature by investigating the spillover effect of the regional turmoil on Dubai Financial Market (DFM). Due to the domino-effect-like political changes, a major Arab Spring event is defined by the shocking regime change in Egypt during the period between the departure of the former and long-lasted Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on February 11th, 2011, and conducting the parliamentary elections there on November 30th, 2011. Both the volatility and returns of DFM are examined around the identified period. We employ the daily returns of seven indices at DFM for the period between January 1st, 2008 and December 31st, 2012 using GARCH model to analyze the effects of Arab Spring sparking in the region on volatility and returns. Moreover, we use Event Study method to examine the effect of the dramatic political change on the stock market returns. The findings of the study reveal that the volatility of the overall DFM has not been impacted except for two indices at DFM; Transportation and Telecommunications. The results remain robust when TGARCH model is run. Further, the Event Study results suggest that the Arab Spring has not affected the returns of any of the DFM indices during the above period since both the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) are insignificant. There are implications to the regulators, the current and potential international and local investors and portfolio managers who are interested in DFM.
This paper develops an agent-based computational model of violent political revolution in which a subjugated population of agents and an armed revolutionary organization try to overthrow a central authority and its loyal forces. The model replicates several patterns of rebellion consistent with the major historical revolutions and provides an explanation for the multiplicity of outcomes that can arise from an uprising. This last point is of particular interest if we consider the heterogeneity of political outcomes produced by the recent revolutionary episodes in the so-called Arab Spring.