This paper seeks to explore the relationship between the framework of transition and the enactment of a new constitution for Egypt. It does so by using the relatively under explored concept of transitional constitutionalism, interrogating some of the key claims on which transitional constitutionalism is based, and questioning their application in the Egyptian context. By doing this the paper explores the broader paradox of the imposition of a framework of transition that is rooted in principles of liberalism in the context where liberalism is far from the agreed or prevailing political model.
The jihadist group known as Islamic Caliphate, which already controls vast area of Syria and Iraq, and is a threat to the neighboring Arab countries has recently proclaimed the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate. The proclamation of a “new system” coming to the contemporary world would only seem vague, if the Islamic Caliphate which now simply calls itself Islamic State (al-dawla al-islamiyya), The sudden emergence of a Caliphate that was so drenched in blood had the world, in the words of one journalist, wondering: ‘Where did these hell hounds come from?. The emergence of the “Caliphate” – an “Islamic State” and the alleged criminal actions associated with this emergence raise a number of important issues in international law, namely: the concept of a state, recognition, the concept of a failed state, the Articles of State Responsibility, cultural property, international humanitarian law including the issue of humanitarian intervention, and the responsibility to protect, and the use of force. More importantly, these events raise the question of the purpose of international law “what is it good for” in the one hand, and what is the Jordanian putative policy in the other hand.
In early 2011, mass protests erupted throughout Libya, political elites defected to form the resistance National Transitional Council, and the international community eventually intervened in the conflict. The result was the ouster of long-ruling leader Muammar Gaddafi and the beginning of considerable political change in Libya. Following the Gaddafi regime’s overthrow, the regional militias that displaced him refused to surrender arms to the interim government and continued to perpetrate illegal detentions, displacements, rapes, and summary executions. This Note assumes that events in Libya constitute an ongoing revolution, and locates the violent episodes associated with it in a historical tradition of violence inherent in revolutionary periods. While revolutionary violence may be politically justifiable ex post, given the network of international and regional law it is no longer legally justifiable. As such, interim Libyan leaders and their successors should ensure both revolutionaries and former Gaddafi supporters are held accountable for their crimes. A hybrid approach, starting with a truth commission with eventual limited prosecutions, is the best way to bring a stable peace to Libya.
The advent of new technology brings new challenges to international law. The Internet is now the world’s primary information source, and websites like Facebook and Twitter have become crucial communication means. During the Arab Spring of 2011, activists used the Internet and social media sites to support their actions against existing oppressive regimes. In response, those governments required Internet service providers to interrupt Internet access, closing down social media communication.
The United States has the will and apparently the technology to restore the Internet in countries where the government has blocked connectivity. Contemporary international law supports a human right to Internet access. After all, people have a right to access information and a freedom to associate and assemble; these norms create a right of access to the Internet, including social media sites.
The issue presented by another nation’s reintroduction of Internet access is whether international law norms prohibiting use of force or intervention are violated. The absolute use of force prohibition found in United Nations Charter Article 2(4) and customary international law only applies to a significant military attack or act of physical violence. Reestablishment of the Internet would require no such actions, making that prohibition inapplicable.
Forcing the Internet on an unwilling country would not violate international norms against foreign intervention. An illegal intervention occurs when one state attempts to coerce another state to change policies within its sovereign domain to reflect the first state’s interests. The reintroduction of the Internet and social media sites cannot be seen as an act of coercion because the outside state is simply providing neutral access to information and communication. In addition, the creation of human rights laws has lessened the exclusive competence of a nation to determine how its inhabitants should be treated. Internet access is a protected international right, which the international community has an interest in upholding. An action to reestablish that basic right does not violate international law; instead, it furthers the peoples’ fundamental self-determination entitlement.
Over the past several decades, states have used international asset freezes with increasing frequency as a mechanism for promoting human rights abroad. Yet the international law governing this mechanism, which I refer to as ‘humanitarian financial intervention,’ remains fragmented. This article offers the first systematic legal analysis of humanitarian financial intervention. It identifies six humanitarian purposes that states may pursue through asset freezes: preserving foreign assets from misappropriation, incapacitating foreign states or foreign nationals, coercing foreign states or foreign nationals to forsake abusive practices, compensating victims, ameliorating humanitarian crises through humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction, and punishing human rights violators. Whether intervening states may pursue these objectives in any given context depends upon the interplay between several international legal regimes, including international investment law, collective-security agreements such as the UN Charter, the customary law of countermeasures, the law of armed conflict, and customary law governing the enforcement of judicial decisions. By disentangling the various international legal regimes that govern humanitarian financial intervention, this article furnishes a preliminary road map for evaluating the legality of past, present, and future financial interventions — including asset freezes directed against the Qaddafi regime during the 2011 Libyan Revolution.
The 2011 “Arab Spring” sparked optimism that there would be profound democratic change in the Middle East, a region dominated by autocratic and oppressive regimes. The lack of rights and fundamental freedom for women in the region was one of the most egregious manifestations of these abusive governments. While women’s rights should be a primary focus of the most prominent human rights NGOs, specifically Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW), these organizations have not directed sustained attention to women’s rights in this area of the world. HRW and Amnesty have allowed ideology and politics to prevail at the expense of true freedom for women.
Recently there has been a significant increase in the involvement of children and young people in protests across the globe. As a result of this increase, children have directly influenced political change but have also faced threats to their safety. This raises distinct children’s rights issues, and the trends identified necessitate both conceptualizing protest involvement from a children’s rights perspective, and critically examining the manner in which the law — at both a national and international level — has approached the involvement of children in such activities. This Article examines the positive obligations of States and argues that children should be recognized as a distinct, valid, and sometimes vulnerable group that has the right to protest and the right to be facilitated in doing so.
The revolution you dream of is not ours. You don’t want to change the world, you want to blow it up. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Dirty Hands (1948).
In this Article the author discusses the problem of how to distinguish terrorists and freedom fighters by offering a new perspective on the matter: the constitutional and international law concept of the right of revolution.
The Article contains a historical and a comparative constitutional analysis which lead to the recognition of terrorism as a crime under international law and of the right of revolution as a general principle of law. The Article addresses legal issues arising in some of the major contemporary events from 9/11 to Arab Spring Uprisings (with a special focus on Syria) as well as the 2011 interlocutory decision of the Special tribunal for Lebanon. Finally, the analysis provides criteria of when and how a revolutionary use of force is justified.
American intervention in the “Muslim World” over the past several years has by no means been non-controversial; rather, critics often charge that we alternatively violate international law or selectively use its protective cloak to advance our own interests. Viewed through this lens, American pronouncements might understandably be received as edicts encroaching upon local autonomy and reminiscent of colonial days. Still, the unfolding acts of violence against Americans and Western embassies in the “Muslim World” following the online posting of a United States-made “Mohammad video” were not foreseen. If they had been, we can assume – and hope – that the relevant embassies would have recalled or at least reduced their staffs especially as violence in the region is not a new phenomenon. However, these unfortunate events present us with an opportunity to query whether these attacks were foreseeable, and to review the psychology behind our being caught off guard.
This solemn occasion perhaps reflects a warped understanding of our hosts’ cultural sensitivities, or even our limited genuine interest in what concerns them at all. We are led to question the ability and willingness of American policymakers to consider – and thereby respect – local priorities. Insofar as Islam permeates the culture of many of these host nations, our priorities reflect our foreign policy’s willingness to accommodate it; is this foreign policy so decidedly grounded in values antagonistic to Islam? To further pressurize the situation, the present conundrum coincidentally presents “Mr. Obama’s most serious foreign policy crisis of the election season.”
In order to strike a respectful balance among nations’ competing interests, international customary law provides standards that all states must respect in order to maintain the peace and stability. Additionally, all members of the United Nations must adhere to the tenets of its charter including principles relating to the use of force and the “sovereign equality of all its Members.” Moreover, the community of nations continues to have a duty to protect populations suffering from a humanitarian disaster. The issue presented before us, is whether we have failed to live up to this responsibility in our dealings with the “Muslim World.” Specifically, has the current Administration acted in violation of international law just as its predecessors are commonly charged to have done? Armed with this knowledge, we might re-consider our regional security expectations.