This paper discusses the data limitations associated with the measurement of top incomes and inequality in the Middle East, with special emphasis to the case of Egypt. It has been noted that high inequality might have contributed to the Arab spring revolt movement. Some studies have argued however that measured inequality in Middle East countries is not particularly large by international standards, and that popular discontent mostly reflects the perceived level of inequality, and the perceived (un)fairness of the distribution. In this paper we review the evidence and present new estimates. We come with two main conclusions. First, data sources at the national level are insufficient to derive reliable estimates of top income shares in a country like Egypt(or in other Middle East countries). One would need reliable fiscal sources in order to make a precise comparison with other emerging or developed countries. Unfortunately, such sources are lacking in most of the region. Next, and irrespective of these uncertainties on within-country inequalities, there is no doubt that income inequality is extremely large at the level of the Middle East taken as whole-simply because regional inequality in per capita GNP is particularly large. According to our benchmark estimates, the share of total Middle East income accruing to the top 10% income receivers is currently 55% (vs.48% in the United States,36% in Western Europe, and 54% in South Africa). Under plausible assumptions, the top 10% income share could be well over 60%, and the top 1% share might exceed 25% (vs. 20% in the United States,11% in Western Europe, and 17% in South Africa). Popular discontent might reflect the fact that perceptions about inequality and the (un)fairness of the distribution are determined by regional (and/or global) inequality, and not only on national inequality.

The opening of LatCrit XVI in San Diego, CA, on October 9, 2011, coincided with the events that are identified as the start of the global expression of the Occupy Movement. The Occupy Movement began to gain media attention on September 17, 2011, in Zuccotti Park in New York City. By October 9, protests had taken place or were ongoing in eighty-two countries and over 600 communities in the United States. The broad theme for LatCrit XVI was “Global Justice” and the conference was billed as “an opportunity to explore theories, histories, and futures of global justice. Of particular importance [was] the relationship between universality and difference, and comparative conceptions of equality and justice.” Now, some four months later, the Occupy Movement has succeeded in changing the zeitgeist by changing the political vocabulary and focusing the U.S. presidential debate as well as much of the globe on income inequality. “We are the 99%” has become a rallying cry about the maldistribution of social resources, especially in the allocation of wealth away from the middle classes towards the ultra-rich. This recent period has come to be called the “American Autumn” in comparing this regional activism and revolutionary fervor with the “Arab Spring,” the months that saw protests against oppressive regimes spread from Tunisia and Egypt through Libya and into more than thirteen other Middle Eastern and North African countries.

The literature on economic determinants of democratization has identified most importantly the effects of economic development and income distribution. In this regard, Egypt had exhibited higher average incomes and declining inequality between 1999 and 2012. However, by 2015, the level of income inequality had reverted near its level in 2008. Although income distribution data are not available for later years, trends in the composition of economic activity suggest that income inequality has likely continued to increase, disempowering the middle class further and contributing to de-democratization. A main puzzle during the build-up to the Arab Spring revolts of 2010-11 was the fact that income inequality in Tunisia and Egypt was relatively low in comparison to countries at similar stages of economic development. Especially for Egypt, this analysis had ignored the vast between-country and within-oil-exporting-country income inequalities, which, according to WID.world scholars’ calculations, had rendered the Middle East the most unequal region in the world. Post-2011 trends have simultaneously integrated Egypt more closely with Gulf economies and transformed the Egyptian economy more closely to follow the investment patterns of the latter. Thus, the short-lived economic trends that fueled demands for democratization in Egypt have been reversed, underpinning the regression of her political system to resemble more closely those of her Gulf benefactors. Although large investments in infrastructure may potentially lead to enhanced productivity and economic re-empowerment of the middle class, past experiences of Gulf economies to which the Egyptian economy is converging suggest otherwise.