“Islam” in particular as well as “the MENA region” more generally continue to be research objects that are often reflected upon in the light of specific grand narratives. “Orientalism”, “Clash of Civilisations”, and the “Arab Spring” are not only indicative of the ambiguous position of “Islam” in varying discourses but also shows its particular relevance within IR due to its meaning in the global realm. Does the requirement to develop an Islamic or Middle Eastern IR theory logically follow? This paper argues that such an endeavour would rather reinforce meta-theoretical narratives and eventually perpetuate Middle Eastern exceptionalism. Instead, this paper seeks to contribute to critical IR theory which accounts for the ‘situatedness’ of meaning that shapes social practices in a particular context. This, however, poses new challenges on the complex issue of in an increasingly globalised world that harbours more and more constitutionalised structures on a global scale, in which the question of legitimacy has to be substantially addressed. Thus, the paper proceeds in three steps: First, it critically assesses predominant IR theories (tacitly) working with normative assumptions, e.g the Westphalian system, and thus producing positivistic scholarship based upon “Western principles”. Second, it will be shown that a turn to reflexive scholarship and interpretive methods in IR not only allow to better assess the diverse practices that are related to “Islam” in different contexts but also constitute the basis to critically approach the question of legitimacy. Third, the discourses during the Syrian uprising will empirically highlight the theoretical claim.
The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China… The survival of the West depends upon Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilization depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.
– Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
… dialogue means exposure to an otherness which lies far beyond the self… it signals an alternative both to imperialist absorption or domination and to pliant self-annihilation… it requires a willingness to ‘risk oneself,’ that is, to plunge headlong into a transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are continuously renegotiated.
– Fred Dallmayr, Beyond Orientalism
A great deal of debate and controversy has been generated by the idea of a “clash of civilizations” between the Western and Islamic worlds. The outcome of this debate, in real terms, is one which has taken on a particular urgency after the Arab Spring. If citizens of majority Muslim states are calling for a new rule of law, including rule of “the law” or the shari‘a, alongside demanding democratic and institutional representation of their values and identities, what does this mean for universal notions of equality, fairness, and human rights? How can minority rights be protected? Is it right to force states writing new constitutions to ensure their conformity with supposedly universal values which are admittedly Western in origin?
Rather than seeing an inevitable clash in these competing values, Fred Dallmayr’s approach is one in which the bounds of the civilizations themselves are not taken for granted as having any real and clear definition, but rather they are evolving entities which, much like individuals in relationships, “risk themselves” in the process of interacting openly in the “transformative learning process in which the status of self and other are constantly renegotiated.” It is this attempt to examine pre-defined boundaries, reassess them, and to create a discursive space between and beyond these boundaries which this paper seeks to undertake in an effort to derive a pluralist framework for understanding normative and political discourses in multi-civilizational, but particularly Western and Islamic contexts.
In terms of political representation, this means that democratization is not privileged above other goals and is just one amongst many other paths for deriving a legitimate constitutional regime that can be a fully participating member of international society. Instead, this approach looks at core political/constitutional values like the Rule of Law, Representation of National Character, and Restriction of State Power which are extremely fluid and flexible in regards to particular normative content. Ultimately, this paper argues that using Dallmayr’s hermeneutically based approach it is possible to create a level playing field on which the contest of ideas can occur. Specifically, it is the process of using foundational political texts to assess the origin of core political values, to examine how they have evolved historically, and to imagine how they may be usefully employed in the future, which this paper argues can provide a way forward in the intransigent debates between advocates of universal values and ardent adherents of local cultural and political traditions.
One important recent trend in constitution-making around the world has been revolutionary constitutionalism: using the constitution-making process to attempt to institutionalize and bring to a successful conclusion a political revolution. Although a good deal of attention has been paid to the specific revolutions involved, there has been far less on the general phenomenon of revolutionary constitutionalism as such. This article attempts to begin redressing this gap by offering some reflections on the general phenomenon and then employing them to inform an analysis of constitution-making in the revolutionary context.
The article makes three main claims. The first is that revolutionary constitutionalism is a useful and illuminating category for the discipline of comparative constitutional law. Empirically, it encompasses a range of situations that implicate constitutionalism in a particular way and raise special challenges. Analytically, it is a distinct concept from the neighboring term “constitutional revolution.” Recognizing this permits us to distinguish, for example, the American Revolution from the New Deal constitutional revolution in qualitative terms, as different in kind and not merely degree. The second is that revolutionary constitutionalism contains within itself certain paradoxes and practical problems that have their source in the combination of initial radical transition and subsequent resistance to further radical change that constitutionalization brings. The final claim concerns the role and importance of constitution-making in the revolutionary context. Although relative to a broad array of socio-political variables, this role is generally less central to the ultimate outcomes of revolutionary constitutionalism than constitutional lawyers often think, it can respond to one distinctive challenge: the need to re-establish political authority lost by the old regime. As the comparison between recent experiences in Egypt and Tunisia suggests, constitution-making can make a key contribution here as one source of the legitimacy that the new regime must acquire.
A paramount task of a democratic nation’s constitution is to prescribe effectively the supreme law of the land derived from the consent of the governed. A constitution seeks to fulfill important legal functions, including organizing political power within a state, establishing government institutions, and providing administrable laws. Constitutions and their surrounding constitutional cultures are often also statements of a nation’s commitment to the ideals it values most highly and aspires to attain. A constitution contains two types of elements: functional and aspirational. The functional elements of a constitution establish the institutions that comprise the state and the pragmatic rules of governance — the “constitution in practice.” Aspirational elements, by contrast, articulate the nation’s commitment to higher principles, such as social justice or democracy. In a well-ordered state, the aspirational aims of a constitution provide the true north for the nation’s compass and determine policies the functional provisions should implement to achieve the legitimacy of the laws and promote a perpetually progressing society. If the functional components of a constitution cannot adequately pursue its aspirational goals, the constitution and government will lose support and lack legitimacy. This disconnect can result in social strife and political unrest. The recent upheaval in the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring, provided three nations thus far with the opportunity to erect new constitutional cultures: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Adequately concretizing revolutionary aspirations in their new national constitutions, while also providing functional elements and institutions to reinforce these aspirations, is vital to the establishment of a secure and legitimate constitutional order. This note explores these ideas of constitutional theory in the universal and applies them to the particular situations in these Arab Spring nations.
BEGINNING IN JANUARY 2011, the Arab world exploded in a vibrant demand for dignity, liberty, and achievable purpose in life, rising up against an image and tradition of arrogant, corrupt, unresponsive authoritarian rule over an alienated population. The Tunisians’ slogan was “Dignity, Liberty, Work, Citizenship”; the Egyptians’ was “Dignity, Freedom, Bread, and Social Justice,” later ensconced in their constitutions.