This book is premised on the notion that subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) within countries not only differ among each other but that they maintain different relations with the federal government, which is why they are reproduced differently. The book argues that alternative pathways of SUR continuity result first and foremost from the capacity (or lack thereof) of democratic presidents to wield power over SURs and autocrats. If presidents have the (fiscal or partisan) resources to induce cooperation from subnational autocrats and can thus secure credible and routine political support, the former have strong incentives to invest in the continuity and stability of undemocratic provincial regimes and autocrats. Under these circumstances, SUR reproduction from above takes place. Conversely, if presidents fail to exert effective power and are prevented from disciplining subnational autocrats via fiscal or partisan means, they will implement policies to oppose and weaken SURs. This does not necessarily lead to SUR breakdown. Local variables, such as subnational autocrats’ capacity to ensure party elite unity and/or mass political support, shape autocrats’ ability to counterbalance presidential attempts at destabilization, and also allow autocrats to keep their regimes alive. Where this occurs, SUR self-reproduction takes place. This explanation of SUR continuity is tested in contemporary Argentina and Mexico using a multi-method approach. Both quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as cross-national and within-country comparisons, are employed to test pathways of SUR continuity in two of Latin America’s largest countries.
In this article lobbying by several Arab countries in the United States is analyzed to answer two questions: What are the ramifications of a regime change for lobbying strategy in the United States? Does lobbying matter in securing US government support? First, the study demonstrates that regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya has had no effect on their lobbying in the United States so far. The analysis of lobbying by countries which eschewed regime change—Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan—surprisingly comes to the same conclusion. Second, the ability of troubled regimes to peacefully control their own populace is more important for securing US support than lobbying.
There were large differences in the responses of Arab dictators to the Arab Spring protests. To understand these differences, I present a stylized model of how a dictator responds to mass protests for democratization in a polarized country with two ethnic or religious groups. In this model, the dictator’s response crucially depends on oil revenues and his affiliation to either the majority or the minority group. I document that the model’s predictions are consistent with the observed differences in the Arab dictators’ responses. Hence, ethnic politics and religious divides may play an important role in political transitions and regime changes.
There has been a wide-spread belief that elections with a wide franchise following removal of an oppressive dictator lead to establishment of a government that is not vulnerable to mass protest. At the same time, most of the post-World War II non-constitutional exits of recently-installed autocratic leaders were caused by elite coups, rather than popular protests. The recent experience of Egypt, where the democratic post-Mubarak government, a result of the Arab Spring, collapsed after having had almost uninterrupted protests since its first day in office, offers a striking counterexample to both of these patterns. We demonstrate that this is a general phenomenon: the same technological shock, arrival of social media, that makes the incumbent vulnerable, lays foundation for continuous instability of the subsequent democratic government. Our theoretical model, which incorporates protest into a Downsian framework, takes into account specific features of modern protests: the significant role of social media and the absence of the partisan or personalized leadership during popular unrest. Case studies of the Arab countries with and without large-scale protests corroborate our theoretical findings.
The year 2011 witnessed unprecedented political change in the Middle East. Citizens took to the streets in mass protest against deepening poverty, high youth unemployment rates, corruption and longtime dictatorship. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen underwent regime changes, while there is an ongoing full-fledged civil war in Syria.
Even the oil-rich Saudi Arabia was swayed by small demonstrations instigated by sectarian strife, high youth and female unemployment rates as well as political repression.
It remains to be seen whether such political changes will bring about significant social and economic transformation. Despite political overturn, the social and economic structures that upheld the previous system are still in place.
The Arab Spring do, however, seem to have shaken the deep-rooted patriarchal and Islamic authoritarianism that has long been rampant in the region. The civilians of the Middle East could too question the legitimacy of the State and demand political change.
The following pages analyse the motivations behind the Russian and Chinese vetoes that prevented three Security Council resolutions from entering into force. In particular, the commonly accepted argument according to which they used their veto power in order to prevent a repetition of the regime change as it happened in Libya will be challenged on various grounds. In particular, it seems that it was not an outright rejection of regime change but rather the frustration of having been left aside during the post-Gaddafi scramble for oil and other economic benefits, that led to their voting behaviour. In addition, Russia almost had no other option than using the veto because of its close ties to the Assad regime. Here, Libya rather created an environment of distrust that compelled Russia to cling on its ally due to the well-grounded fear that a newly-imposed regime would not continue this special relationship.
Most, if not all, post-World War II non-constitutional exits from power by recently-installed leaders have been caused by elite coups, not popular uprisings. The recent experience of Egypt, where the post-Mubarak government collapsed after almost uninterrupted protests since its first day in office, offers a striking counterexample to this pattern. Our theoretical model, incorporating protest into a dynamic Downsian framework, features the significant role of social media and the absence of partisan or personalized leadership. In equilibrium, it is possible to have recurrent protests. Moreover, even non-radical incumbents with wide support can suffer from them. We show that recurrent revolutions feature the emergence of new dictators on the opposite side of the political spectrum.