As Obama begins his second term, this article takes stock of his foreign policy approach towards the Middle East. It lays out four big arguments. First, Obama’s foreign policy in the Middle East has demonstrated more continuity with the past than real change. While shifting his approach significantly from Bush’s, Obama has adopted a centrist—realist approach towards the region, consistent with the dominant US foreign policy orientation. Second, from Palestinian—Israeli peace to Afghanistan, Obama’s conduct testifies to the structural—institutional continuity of US foreign policy. More than in any other region in the world, presidential policy in the Middle East is hampered by institutional, bureaucratic and domestic politics. America’s dysfunctional political culture has imposed severe constraints on Obama’s ability to pursue an even-handed approach towards the enduring and preeminent Palestine question. Third, despite Obama’s lofty rhetoric about a new start in relations between the United States and Muslim countries, the Middle East does not rank very high on his agenda. Putting America’s fiscal house in order and renewing its long-term economic strength have been Obama’s priorities. From the outset, Obama has been shifting US foreign policy priorities away from the Middle East to the Pacific and Asia where he and his aides believe that America’s future lies. Finally, the article argues that the US finds itself in a similar position to that of Great Britain after the Second World War, at the beginning of the end of its hegemonic moment in the Middle East. The end of American hegemony in the region stems from internal and external causes, including an awakened public opinion in the Middle East, the emergence of geostrategic and geo-economic regional powers with assertive foreign policies, America’s relative economic decline and the high costs of war, and the shift in US foreign policy priorities to the Asia—Pacific region.

This article argues that Iran’s “Arab option” – the Arab and pro-Palestinian tilt in Iran’s foreign policy – did not emerge out of the ideological musings of Iran’s Islamic revolutionaries, but out of Iran’s new-found position of preeminence in the later years of the Shah’s rule. The sustainability of Iran’s regional leadership required Arab acceptance and support, which could only be won through a pro-Arab orientation in Iran’s foreign policy.

Foreign policy and security have been significant issues for the European Union since its foundation, and the EU’s role in the maintenance of international peace and security has been discussed intensively. This article explores the international role and approach of the EU in this area in the light of arguments in the relevant literature and official statements of the EU. It goes on to investigate whether the EU has succeeded in developing policies corresponding to its international role and approach in the 21st century within the framework of policies in regard to the Second Gulf War; the issue of Iran’s nuclear activities; and the Arab Spring. Additionally, the effects of these three issues on the international role of the EU and on its approach towards the maintenance of international peace and security are also studied. In considering that the US has the leading role in all these three issues as the hegemonic actor, the article explores whether the EU could be an attraction centre in the international community as an alternative to the US via a self-determined international role.

While the immediate outcome of the Iraq War of 2003 was certainly to Israel’s strategic advantage, the more immediate and indeed visceral challenge of the ongoing Al-Aqsa intifada has dominated the security horizons of most Israelis. The legacy of this conflict, with its strong Islamist overtones, has clearly had a bearing on how the Arab Awakening has come to be perceived by Israel. Taking this experience as its starting point, this article examines the response by Tel Aviv to the Arab Awakening at an elite level and how, for the most part, Israeli perceptions of its Islamist essence, an essence that rejects popular accountability, continues to be viewed through a predominantly Realist prism. Such perceptions look set to endure, shaping Israel’s immediate attitudes towards the Palestinians and the wider Arab world. The authors argue that while Israeli concerns over the trajectory of the Arab Awakening do carry empirical weight, such concerns can be equally understood as part of a wider critique with regard to Israel’s own emerging democratic deficit. This was seen most recently in a raft of legislative bills put before the Knesset between 2009 and 2012 designed to curb civil liberties in Israel; alongside its continued occupation of Palestinian lands and wider demographic shifts, such moves increasingly tarnish Israel’s proud claim to be both Jewish and democratic.