The Palestinian plan to ask the UN for statehood in September has provoked intense anxiety in Jerusalem and Washington. But the move is less provocative than commonly thought. Palestinian leaders are not aiming at short-circuiting the peace process; they are trying to level the playing field in order to promote future negotiations with Israel and the United States.

The early hope that the two-state solution would be implemented during the Obama presidency faded as both the Mitchell and Kerry negotiations failed. Only during his final weeks in office did Obama agree to the US abstaining on a UN vote condemning the ongoing Israeli settlements in territory earmarked as part of a future Palestinian state. After he leaves the presidency, there is a slim chance that Obama might join Jimmy Cater in working to mobilize American voters and taxpayers around efforts by Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) and other movements to oppose pro-Zionist lobbies, especially American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and to force Congress and the President to pressure Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories and enable the creation of a de-militarized Palestinian state.

The Palestinian Authority’s application to become a full member state at the United Nations represents the latest stage in its “alternative peace strategy” born of the collapse of the U.S.-sponsored Oslo peace process. But—argues the author—the new strategy remains overly dependent on diplomacy and uncertain Palestinian allies like the European Union. If it is to achieve a balance of power for future negotiations more favorable to the Palestinians, however, it will need to be anchored in a greater national consensus at home and in the diaspora, and allied more closely to the emerging democratic forces in the region.

This article analyzes the Israeli position toward the Arab Peace Initiative (API), which was adopted by the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut. The API has been the most dramatic and progressive Arab initiative ever presented to Israel, and has remained on the negotiating table ever since it was first proposed. Unwilling to recognize the magnitude of the change in the Arab position, succeeding Israeli governments have never officially responded to the initiative for various reasons. The main argument of the article is that by constantly evading the API, Israel has missed a genuine opportunity to advance the peace process.

In 2011, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 37 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths. This significant increase from the 31 conflicts recorded in 2010 was primarily driven by an increase in conflicts on the African continent, and is only in part due to events tied to the Arab Spring which mosdy led to other forms of violence than conventional armed conflict. The number of active conflicts still remains at a relatively low level compared to the peak years in the early 1990s, when more than 50 conflicts were active. The number of wars – conflicts leading to 1,000 or more batde-related deaths – increased to six; however, it is a considerably lower number than during the peak years of the early 1990s. For the second consecutive year, Afghanistan claimed the highest number of fatalities. Five armed conflicts listed for 2010 were not active in 2011, but during the year three new conflicts erupted – Libya, South Sudan and Sudan (Abyei) – and six conflicts already registered were restarted. Only one peace agreement was concluded during the year. Thus, the trend with low numbers of peace accords which started in 2009 continues.

Shortly after WikiLeaks published thousands of confidential US diplomatic cables, Al Jazeera released hundreds of classified documents pertaining to the Palestinian—Israeli negotiations. Known as the ‘Palestine Papers’, these documents are noteworthy not only because they provide insights into the stalled negotiations and rekindle the debate over the Middle East conflict, but also because they offer a glimpse into the complex interpenetration between media, geo-politics, and state interests in a conflict-ridden region in the post-WikiLeaks era.

This article introduces Fikra Forum, an ongoing experiment in online engagement that attempts to help fill a serious gap in communication and mutual understanding in both the virtual and the real worlds. It offers a platform for activists, experts, and concerned citizens throughout the Middle East to share their ideas and experiences directly with an interested American audience—and with each other. The focus is on issues of democracy, reform, religious tolerance, and countering violent extremism in the region, all broadly defined.

President Barack Obama won the 2008 US presidential race with promises to restore America’s lost image and status in the world, to lead the world again to achieve peace and dignity, and to start a “new beginning” with Muslims worldwide. This article examines Obama’s promised “new beginning” with Muslims in the Middle East and assesses his Middle East policy to determine whether his policy marks a break from the previous George W. Bush administration’s Mideast policy. First, it presents a comparative discussion on Bush’s and Obama’s Mideast policies and then turns to analyze a series of important issues that critically affects US-Mideast relations. It concludes that in the last five years (2009-2013) President Obama has, at best, achieved a mixed record –in some cases his approach has produced positive outcomes, in other cases, his policy is more a continuation of George W. Bush’s policy.