The 1999 decree by Kuwait’s emir granting women electoral rights, and its subsequent parliamentary rejection, is more than just an instance of women’s oppression in action. It also demonstrates a potential paradox between two axes of democratization: liberalization, the existence of a sphere of meaningful public contestation, and participation, that the right to participate in that sphere is extended to all. In Kuwait, 1999 represents an instance where those two axes were in direct competition. This article explores the 1999 enfranchisement as a way of understanding this democratic paradox and then follows these issues through the successful 2005 enfranchisement and the election of female Assembly members in 2007 and in the 2012, post-Arab Spring elections.

This paper argues that the purpose of democratization in Jordanian politics is not only a political co-optation policy to cope with the negative effects of the country’s economic recession, but also to ensure the survival of the Hashemite monarchy. The process of democratization in the region has been closely tied with the notions of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. This is due to ‘incomplete’ national identity-building formation in most parts of the Middle East. For that particular purpose, the main objective of this paper is not to re-assert the uniqueness of politics in the Arab world, but rather to engage in how politics of regime survival in the case of Jordan shape the process of democratization in the post – 1989 era. Thus this paper will examine the period following the normalization of relations with Israel in 1994, the Palestinian question, the repercussions of current social upheavals in the Arab world, and how these specific circumstances affect Jordan’s democratic opening.

The Arab revolts have resulted in deposed heads of state in Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. Of these countries the latter two—Egypt and Tunisia—saw mass street protestors quickly topple entrenched autocrats without significant violence or foreign intervention. One year on, Egypt is still ruled by elements of the Mubarak regime with vested interests in the former order. It is also racked by political battles and economic troubles that are threatening its transition. Tunisia, on the other hand, is moving steadily closer toward a potential democratic consolidation. What explains the differences? This commentary discusses the prior institutional characteristics of the two countries. It then examines three areas of early transitional choices that contributed to Tunisia’s progress and undermined Egypt’s. In identifying lessons learned it makes the case that oppositional movements should avoid constitutional and institutional vacuums, establish broadly representative civilian-led transitional planning mechanisms, and follow appropriately-timed, transparent electoral sequencing.

Four years after the end of its uprising against the Gaddafi regime, Libya remains in chaos. It is worth noting that for the third time since their independence in 1951, the Libyans’ attempts to create a modern and powerful state seem to be ‘wishful thinking’. The first two failed attempts – in 1951 and 1969 – were essentially local affairs without significant consequences beyond the country’s borders. The ongoing turmoil which followed in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011 is leading to serious regional and international destabilization. This paper discusses the main factors of the instability in post-Gaddafi Libya. According to the authors’ analysis, there are the following main obstacles in the process of transition toward democracy and peace: two competing governments, multiplicity of militias and combat groups operating in Libya, jihadism rising in power as well as the regional and ethnic claims for recognition and autonomy. The last part of this paper is devoted to potential scenarios for the future of Libya.