This paper argues that the purpose of democratization in Jordanian politics is not only a political co-optation policy to cope with the negative effects of the country’s economic recession, but also to ensure the survival of the Hashemite monarchy. The process of democratization in the region has been closely tied with the notions of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. This is due to ‘incomplete’ national identity-building formation in most parts of the Middle East. For that particular purpose, the main objective of this paper is not to re-assert the uniqueness of politics in the Arab world, but rather to engage in how politics of regime survival in the case of Jordan shape the process of democratization in the post – 1989 era. Thus this paper will examine the period following the normalization of relations with Israel in 1994, the Palestinian question, the repercussions of current social upheavals in the Arab world, and how these specific circumstances affect Jordan’s democratic opening.

Far from taking place in a vacuum, in Morocco the 2011 constitutional revision was assessed both from an internal political perspective and within the broader context of what has come to be called the ‘Arab Spring’. In this manner, the 2011 Moroccan Constitution has indeed marked an unprecedented change, declaring the State’s adherence to the protection of human rights, which are strictly related to the Western history of ‘secular constitutionalism’. Yet, in order to better understand the constitutional transition, one has to consider the religious characteristic of Moroccan monarchy which, on the other hand, makes it a prototype of a ‘globalizing monarchy’, especially within the context of MENA (Middle East and Nord African) region. The Moroccan constitutional transition can in fact be seen as a peculiar tool for taking into account endogenous and exogenous factors respectively. On the one hand, it allows us to investigate how an Islamic specific legal tradition interacts with some principles that represent the pillars of constitutional democracies and that, as such, have been universally recognised; at least in the West. On the other, the exceptionalism of ‘Moroccan spring’ lets us to evaluate how these very principles are contextualized in a peculiar context of MENA region; by which, for the same reasons, one can draw more general considerations concerning the relationship between the pressing process of globalization and post-colonial Muslim-majority States.

Assessing the long-term fallout from the 2003 Iraq War from three perspectives—the state, regional and international—this article argues that the war generated a series of changes that have had a central impact on the political evolution and international relations of the Middle East, though not in the manner anticipated by either its supporters or critics. The war and its consequences, which have become merged with developments surrounding the Arab Spring uprisings, which started at the end of 2010, have contributed over the long term to the acceleration of popular demands for the greater liberalization of politics, to shifts in the regional balance of power and to international realignments. Authoritarian regimes across the region have been increasingly challenged; there are new sectarian divides; Iran has been empowered by the demise of its old rival Saddam Hussein; new ‘pivotal’ states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey have emerged; and western powers have had to review their policy prescriptions and assumptions of regional predominance. The new regional order is both fragile and contested. Taking a long view of the Iraq War on its tenth anniversary is important and relevant to understanding contemporary developments in the region—whether in Syria or elsewhere—and serves to highlight patterns of continuity as well as change. Given the continuing violence and bloodshed in Iraq itself, it also offers some important lessons to regional and external powers about the perils of intervention.

Pan-Arabism has not succeeded as an ideology so far, but it is not to say that all of its variants have failed altogether. The ideological clarity desired by such a vision is simply not present, for, even amongst its founders, there is a clash and a severe variance over who does and can refer to themselves as an Arab. Strong political Will has also been lacking. An effective sense of brotherhood can actually be forged only when there is continued stability in the Arab world. Under the current conditions Pan-Arabism will continue to shimmy along like a fire on a torch since neither Zionist occupation nor American subservience is about to die out soon.

This article looks at the ongoing political changes in two non-democratic regimes moving beyond the ‘authoritarian resilience’ model. Five years after the Arab Uprisings, Jordan and Algeria seem to have resisted the revolutionary wave that has shaken the whole MENA region. According to the old debate informed by ‘authoritarian resilience’ and ‘democratic transition’ models, a series of obstacles in the political, economic or social sphere would prevent a successful ‘transition’ to democracy in some countries more than in others. Despite the criticisms addressed to the classical version of these models, they still influence most of the explanations of what happened after 2011, even though in their ‘upgraded’ version (Haydemann 2007; Heydemann and Leenders 2011). However, given the specific set of challenges and transformations each of the countries is going through, this framework becomes increasingly unsatisfactory. Jordan and Algeria are two profoundly diverse countries, and yet both are quite exceptional cases in their own right. Compared to other Arab monarchies, Jordan stands between the untouched authoritarian Gulf model and the constitutional reformist path followed by Morocco (Yom 2011; Yom and Gause 2012). As for Algeria, it was the only republic in the region to be apparently not affected by the regional turmoil (Volpi 2013). Still, in order to survive the 2011 protests, both regimes were forced to approve a number of ‘facade’ reforms. This article argues that such reforms, despite being mostly formal concessions, seen from a different angle could also be a starting point for more substantial long-term transformations. After all, does a truly “resilient” authority, elite or regime really exist?