The Western world’s response to the Arab Spring revolutions has varied. The uprising in Egypt was relatively bloodless; Libya is being thrown into a civil war. Europe has seen the opportunity to re-exert its military might, lest the world forget they too have a military that can be depended upon. Israel has remained relatively quiet, glad that attention has shifted away from Palestine. Among all this, the US is trying to figure out where its foreign policy should focus. The question of what kind of relationship the US will, and should, have with the Middle East, is at the top of discussions domestically. And despite all the international media coverage, the multitudes of academic articles and a plethora of material and expertise available to policymakers, no concrete strategy has emerged from the Obama administration.

Since attaining observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2005, Iran has been one of the observer countries that have sought full membership in the SCO. Iran showed its desire to become full member of the SCO clearly with a speech made by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the summit held in Shanghai on 15 June 2006. Although its first official attempt to become a full member of the SCO was denied in 2008, Iran’s continuing interest in becoming a member has kept it waiting with the hope that changes in the international environment may someday turn to its advantage. Since then, a number of changes occurring across the Central Asia and Middle East regions show potential for creating opportunities for SCO observer states to attain full membership. This article analyzes the repercussions of developments in the international environment on Russia’s and China’s stances toward enlargement of the SCO, along with the changing parameters of the Middle East region in the wake of the Arab Spring, with a focus on their implications for Iran’s potentialfor achieving full membership in the SCO. These changes in the international environment are evaluated from a realist perspective and a framework based on the SCO’s brief historical development and its enlargement policy.

This article explores explanations of Russia’s unyielding alignment with the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad since the Syrian crisis erupted in the spring of 2011. Russia has provided a diplomatic shield for Damascus in the UN Security Council and has continued to supply it with modern arms. Putin’s resistance to any scenario of western-led intervention in Syria, on the model of the Libya campaign, in itself does not explain Russian policy. For this we need to analyse underlying Russian motives. The article argues that identity or solidarity between the Soviet Union/Russia and Syria has exerted little real influence, besides leaving some strategic nostalgia among Russian security policy-makers. Russian material interests in Syria are also overstated, although Russia still hopes to entrench itself in the regional politics of the Middle East. Of more significance is the potential impact of the Syria crisis on the domestic political order of the Russian state. First, the nexus between regional spillover from Syria, Islamist networks and insurgency in the North Caucasus is a cause of concern—although the risk of ‘blowback’ to Russia is exaggerated. Second, Moscow rejects calls for the departure of Assad as another case of the western community imposing standards of political legitimacy on a ‘sovereign state’ to enforce regime change, with future implications for Russia or other authoritarian members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia may try to enshrine its influence in the Middle East through a peace process for Syria, but if Syria descends further into chaos western states may be able to achieve no more in practice than emergency coordination with Russia.

The article argues that Turkey’s perception of the West has been heavily influenced by its idealized identity. After evaluating the circumstances under which this idealized identity began to weaken, it shows how the images of the US and Europe have started to get compartmentalized and Israel separated from the image of the West. The article explains the relationship between the continuing process redefining Turkey’s “personal identity” and its growing interest in the Middle East. The transformation process that Turkey is passing through is critically important in understanding the way in which Turkey has been affected by the upheavals and is reacting to the new developments in the region. In this vein the article highlights the interaction between power considerations and aspirations to re-define identity at home and abroad.

In November 2012 it was ten years since the Justice and Development Party became the party of government in Turkey. During that time, it has raised its profile abroad and sought to project its influence. In particular, it has tried to increase its impact on the European Union and the Middle East—the primary regions to which Turkey lies adjacent. This approach has been parcelled up in the name of turning Turkey from a state of marginal importance into a ‘centre’ country. The relationship to the EU got off to a good start; Turkey adopted liberal EU norms wholesale, before relations soured over Cyprus and membership in general. By 2006, ties were moribund. Links with the Middle East also started well. Turkey avoided the worst effects of the 2003 Iraq war; and its stature was at its zenith in the early months of the ‘Arab Spring’, when it raised the slogan ‘let the people decide’. But this was hubris. By the summer of 2011, it had become clear that Turkey had miscalculated both with regard to the timing of regime change in Syria and its own leverage, whether on the ground or with NATO. Rather than a new, transregional power house, Turkey looked tentative, frequently inert and increasingly dependent on NATO. Turkey remains a country subject to the highly contrasting twin gravities of the EU and the Middle East in spite of its leadership aspirations and its will to accomplish more.

The Arab Spring gave rise to a variety of transitions in the Middle East. Although initial developments in Tunisia and Egypt created optimism, tragic events in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and elsewhere revived fears about a return to authoritarian governments, failed states and civil war. With no foreseeable change in the UN Security Council with regard to Syria, the country’s neighbors, including Turkey, face the risk of instability. Although a recent agreement between the US and Russia marked a major step toward destrying the regime’s chemical stockpile, it fails to address the conflict itself. As such, spillover effects continue to threaten Syria’s neighbors. This paper highlights the critical nature of the situation and the international community’s role in finding a solution.

The wave of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa has not only affected Russia’s interests but also opens some new opportunities for strengthening Russian influence. Nevertheless, the prevalent attitude in Moscow towards these dissimilar but inter-connected crises is negative, which is caused primarily by the nature of its own corrupt quasi-democratic regime haunted by the specter of revolution. The stalled NATO intervention in Libya has refocused the attention of the Russian leadership on the issue of sovereignty, which determines the decision to disallow any UN sanctions against Syria. Russia’s position has evolved in synch with the course taken by China, and Moscow is interested in strengthening this counter-revolutionary proto-alliance by building up ties with conservative Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia, and also by upgrading its strategic partnership with Turkey. Harvesting unexpected dividends from the turmoil in the Arab world,Russia cannot ignore the risks of a sudden explosion of a revolutionary energy – and neither can it effectively hedge against such a risk.