How do states attempt to use their position as destinations for labor migration to influence sending states, and under what conditions do they succeed? I argue that economically driven cross-border mobility generates reciprocal political economy effects on sending and host states. That is, it produces migration interdependence. Host states may leverage their position against a sending state by either deploying strategies of restriction — curbing remittances, strengthening immigration controls, or both — or displacement — forcefully expelling citizens of the sending state. These strategies’ success depends on whether the sending state is vulnerable to the political economy costs incurred by host states’ strategy, namely if it is unable to absorb them domestically and cannot procure the support of alternative host states. I also contend that displacement strategies involve higher costs than restriction efforts and are therefore more likely to succeed. I demonstrate my claims through a least-likely, two-case 25 study design of Libyan and Jordanian coercive migration diplomacy against Egypt in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. I examine how two weaker Arab states leveraged their position against Egypt, a stronger state but one vulnerable to migration interdependence, through the restriction and displacement of Egyptian migrants.
This study quantifies four alternative macroeconomic scenarios for the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs), with the use of GEM-E3, a general equilibrium model. The four scenarios are: i) the continuation of current policies, ii) southern Mediterranean–EU cooperation, iii) a global opening of the southern Mediterranean countries and cooperation with the rest of the Middle East and other developing countries like China, and iv) a deterioration in the regional political climate and a failure of cooperation. Explicit assumptions on trade integration, infrastructure upgrade, population growth and governance developments are adopted in each scenario. The simulation results indicate that an infrastructure upgrade and governance improvements in the context of SEMC–EU cooperation could benefit most of the countries under consideration. The analysis remains important in light of ongoing regional developments and the need to design the best policies to pursue in the aftermath of the Arab spring.
The current fiscal imbalances and fragilities in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMC) are the result of decades of instability, but have become more visible since 2008, when a combination of adverse economic and political shocks (the global and European financial crises, Arab Spring) hit the region. In an environment of slower growth and higher public expenditure pressures, fiscal deficits and public debts have increased rapidly. This has led to the deterioration of current accounts, a depletion of official reserves, the depreciation of some currencies and higher inflationary pressure.
To avoid the danger of public debt and a balance-of-payment crisis, comprehensive economic reforms, including fiscal adjustment, are urgently needed. These reforms should involve eliminating energy and food subsidies and replacing them with targeted social assistance, reducing the oversized public administration and privatizing public sector enterprises, improving the business climate, increasing trade and investment openness, and sector diversification. The SEMC may also benefit from a peace dividend if the numerous internal and regional conflicts are resolved.
However, the success of economic reforms will depend on the results of the political transition, i.e., the ability to build stable democratic regimes which can resist populist temptations and rally political support for more rational economic policies.
This article was written a year before the political upheaval in the Arab world began, but that does not diminish the relevance of the thesis advanced. The changes occurring in Tunisia and Egypt are a clear indication that the gap separating the Mediterranean’s northern shores from its southern rim is primarily of a political nature (Gabriel 2009, pp. 305-332). What burdens the Mediterranean is not – as Samuel Huntington suggests – a clash of civilizations but clashing patterns of governance. It is this divide that, so far, has hindered the establishment of relations and structures that are more than traditional and bilateral.
The divide is anything but new. As the article shows, three different eras can be distinguished. There was a first or pre-modern gap that existed before the formation of the European nation states in the 17th century. There was a second or modern divide which ended with the Second World War, and there followed a third or post-modern gap that began with the formation of the European Union. The present divide shows in terms of sovereignty. Whereas the states to the north, as members of the supranational European Union, are willing to redefine (and qualify) their sovereign independence, the states of the southern shore cling rigidly to their more recently gained sovereignty and independence. The new division, therefore, is characterized by political transformation on one side of the Mediterranean and by continued adherence to fairly traditional conceptions of sovereignty on the other side.
The so called Arab Spring has put The Mediterranean in an era of remaking. Over again, Mediterranean security is being at stake. This paper examines the profound implications of securitizing the Arab Spring on The Mediterranean Security Complex, as developed in Barry Buzan and Ole Waever’s Regions and Powers (Buzan and Waever 2003). The theoretical framework of the paper takes advantage of Buzan and Waever’s work on Regional Security Complexes and securitization/de-securitization processes they are defined through. Then, it attempts at casting light on the defects of any discursive discourse that aims at over-presenting the Arab Spring as a security threat that urges “exceptional” perspectives to be dealt with. Afterward, the paper concludes with a call for de-securitizing the Arab Spring as a necessary step on any future roadmap to secure the region.