This article asks whether there are lessons that can be drawn from the democratization of Iraq for the possible democratization of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the wake of the 2010–2011 Arab uprisings. The paper draws on the democratization program in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 to demonstrate that focusing on the promotion of a liberal democratic model in Iraq translated into a lack of operational flexibility, which let democracy assistance unable to cope with socio-economic demands, local realities and reactions to democratization. Taking into account a variation in the intensity of interventionism between Iraq and MENA, the article argues that there is sufficient similarities between both cases to point Western democracy promoters in the direction of models of democracy that offer a more comprehensive response to the current political transition in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya than the traditional focus on the promotion of liberal democracy does.

Because certain movements in the Arab world of the 1930s and 1940s showed similarities to Mussolini’s and Hitler s regimes, historians have drawn comparisons with the fascist and National Socialist dictatorships. But not even those arguing for the concept of a “generic fascism” are able to wholeheartedly subsume these movements under their fascist rubric. Fascism and National Socialism evolved in Europe, were shaped by the mood at the fin de siècle, became effective after the First World War in a unique political, social, economic and cultural atmosphere, and only lost their appeal in 1945 at the conclusion of the Second World War. They flourished in industrialized societies and aimed—in novel and twisted ways—at reversing the liberalization of 19 th -century Europe. They emphasized power, national rebirth, military order and efficiency; and they were, in the case of Germany, driven by anti-Semitism and racism, resulting in totalitarian rule with genocidal consequences. National-socialist and fascist movements and regimes required the atmosphere and culture of liberal democracy as a foil—and liberal democracy was virtually nonexistent in the Near and Middle East. The preconditions for fascism were thus lacking. Colonial rule was still in place, traditional culture still prevailed in these mainly rural societies, and their small bourgeois parties showed greater allegiance to their clans than to liberal and secular ideologies.

Western and international democratization projects in the Arab world, as elsewhere, have been controversial mainly because, unlike traditional foreign aid through government-to-government channels that strengthened executive institutions, projects in the fields of elections, rule of law, and civil society are funded and executed principally through extra-governmental channels. While foreign democracy brokers successfully cultivated relationships with some liberal think-tanks and other institutions during the 1990s, there was also a political backlash as Arab governments attempted to restore their monopolies over foreign funding and the production of political information.

The 1999 decree by Kuwait’s emir granting women electoral rights, and its subsequent parliamentary rejection, is more than just an instance of women’s oppression in action. It also demonstrates a potential paradox between two axes of democratization: liberalization, the existence of a sphere of meaningful public contestation, and participation, that the right to participate in that sphere is extended to all. In Kuwait, 1999 represents an instance where those two axes were in direct competition. This article explores the 1999 enfranchisement as a way of understanding this democratic paradox and then follows these issues through the successful 2005 enfranchisement and the election of female Assembly members in 2007 and in the 2012, post-Arab Spring elections.

Since 2003 and the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish diplomacy has moved from a conservative (or Realpolitik) doctrine of foreign policy (sovereignty and security as priorities, the doctrine of ‘balance of power’, the use of military force being possible in cases where other democracies would negotiate) to a more liberal policy (trade, including cultural goods, as a priority; negotiations with all the neighbours to meet the targets of the ‘Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors’; the use of cultural and/or religious proximity with certain countries to increase trade and influence). The Turkish case is interesting because the Realpolitik doctrine was implemented for decades by politicians and diplomats concerned with the idea of ‘modernization’, i.e. making Turkey a ‘normal’ European country with a ‘normal’ foreign policy according to the dominant Western European conception of international relations. How far is such a move to a different doctrine possible? Under which conditions is it possible? What could the consequences be, and what kind of consequences would be acceptable? What could the internal and external purposes be in fine? ‘National issues’ such as Turkey’s rivalry with Greece on the Aegean, the Cypriot and Kurdish questions obviously slow down the transition because of the internal resistance from the military, the diplomats, and the political parties (in power or in opposition). External factors such as the hostility to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership in the West European political elite and public opinion, the Arab revolutions or the Iranian nuclear crisis forced the AKP government to adapt, to adjust and to take risks it was not ready to take at the beginning of the process.

Terrible rulers, sullen populations, a terrorist fringe—the Arabs’ exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral one. Then, a frustrated Tunisian fruit vendor summoned his fellows to a new history, and millions heeded his call. The third Arab awakening came in the nick of time, and it may still usher in freedom.

As the Arab Spring unfolds, a new power configuration is emerging in the Middle East. Turkey is at the center of the new setting, with a fully engaged leadership role that was adopted by the ruling AK Party. In the Levant area, Ankara’s influence is even greater due to Turkey’s full support of the Syrian opposition against the Syrian Baath regime. In this context, it becomes clear that the increasingly involved Turkish role in the region has direct and indirect effects on the stability of countries in the Levant, one of which is Lebanon.