The world has become increasingly networked and unpredictable. Decision makers at all levels are required to manage the consequences of complexity every day. They must deal with problems that arise unexpectedly, generate uncertainty, are characterised by interconnectivity, and spread across traditional boundaries. Simple solutions to complex problems are usually inadequate and risk exacerbating the original issues.
Leaders of international bodies such as the UN, OECD, UNESCO and WHO — and of major business, public sector, charitable, and professional organizations — have all declared that systems thinking is an essential leadership skill for managing the complexity of the economic, social and environmental issues that confront decision makers. Systems thinking must be implemented more generally, and on a wider scale, to address these issues.
An evaluation of different systems methodologies suggests that they concentrate on different aspects of complexity. To be in the best position to deal with complexity, decision makers must understand the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches and learn how to employ them in combination. This is called critical systems thinking. Making use of over 25 case studies, the book offers an account of the development of systems thinking and of major efforts to apply the approach in real-world interventions. Further, it encourages the widespread use of critical systems practice as a means of ensuring responsible leadership in a complex world.
It is natural for someone looking in on a foreign culture from the outside to interpret what they see and frame their reactions based on their own background and assumptions. With cultures as a different as those of the Middle East and the West, the potential for blunders increases dramatically, made worse by the high political, diplomatic, military, and commercial stakes involved. Leadership culture in this region has been shaped over centuries through a variety of factors, such as reputation, family, and religion, which continue to influence decision making. The present study posits that an understanding of these factors and how they work is crucial for intelligence analysts, policy and decision makers, strategists, and scholars who must find their way through a very unfamiliar cultural landscape in the Middle East. It is hoped that this discussion will in some way assist in the creation of more effective interaction, policies, and analysis associated with the Middle East.
Authoritarian rulers face constant, structural threats to their survival (Schedler, forthcoming). To explain the downfall of authoritarian regimes, “transitologists” and students of authoritarian regimes focus on elite factionalism as the key destabilizing force. As the Arab Spring, the Colored Revolutions, and the fall of communism in 1989 suggest, however, aggrieved masses might pose an equally formidable threat to non-democratic regimes. But what do we know about mass uprisings, especially in authoritarian regimes? “Preference falsification” (Kuran 1991) and “structural opacity” (Schedler, forthcoming) make it difficult to predict their onset. Yet beyond this opacity in our research, it appears that we really do not know much about mass contestation in general. What explains the speed and extent of mass mobilization? How do the structures and (re)actions of authoritarian regimes influence the dynamics of mobilization? Critical Mass Theory (CMT) (Karklins and Petersen 1993, Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1994) as well as Social Movement Theory (SMT) (see, e.g. Benford and Snow 2000, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, McCarthy and Zald 1987, Rucht 2012, Tarrow 1998, and, for a more critical approach Beinin and Vairel 2011a, Goodwin and Jasper 1999, Kurzman 2004) provide some answers to these questions, especially when the findings of these two theoretical strands are combined.
Looking at the many occurrences of mass contestation since 1989, we assert that all of them had their distinct dynamics (see also: Plattner 2011, Way 2011). Most glaring, some mass uprisings were led by a distinct group of counter-elites (mainly the Colored Revolutions, bar Kyrgyzstan), whereas other uprisings did without a clear-cut leadership (the 1989 revolutions and the Arab Spring). Does leadership make a difference for dynamics of mass contestation? And do they make a difference for the (possible) outcomes of mass contestation? We address these two questions by looking at two cases of successful mass contestation: Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 (with opposition leadership) and the Arab Spring in Egypt in 2011 (largely without opposition leadership). In addition to secondary sources, we conducted more than a dozen semi-structured interviews with opposition activists and participant observers in both countries during the summer of 2012.
European security has historically been linked to the expectations – capabilities gap of the EU, as we; the EU’s role as a normative power as reflected by the conscious choices made by European leaderships. Treaties have been the defining parameters of the operational ability, cognitive potential and institutional capacity of Europe to play a normative role in world politics. The Arab Spring phenomenon has illustrated the actual potential of the EU to act in a uniform way. It has also shown that when inherent European idealism clashes with the realities of international politics, securitized idealism becomes the only viable choice. The concept bears a value-security oxymoron and is based on the need to balance security needs and the desire to spill over democracy in the Arab world.
Contrary to popular media coverage, the Arab Spring was not the first time Arab women took on leadership roles in populist uprisings. As far back as the 1919 Egyptian revolution against the British occupation, women in the Middle East have played pivotal roles in both political movements and mass protests. Indeed, women constituted a significant proportion of street protesters during the 1960s Algerian revolution, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and in Palestine during the First Intifada. This article posits that the biggest challenge facing women in Arab Spring countries is transforming their leadership and attendant influence during the revolutions into high level governance positions, both elected and appointed, after the revolutions. Despite their involvement in past revolutions, whether against native dictators or foreign occupiers, women in the Middle East have yet to attain the degree of political representation that reflects the scope of their contributions in deposing regimes. As soon as the conflicts end and the revolutionary fervor is over, society reverts back to traditional gender roles wherein women are expected to stay out of the political process beyond exercising any voting rights they may have. Their social and political positions remain largely unaffected notwithstanding their sacrifices. Without women’s participation in social and political institutions, nations are unable to develop healthy and sustainable democracies. And as a result, democracy repeatedly eludes the nations of the Middle East.
What will differentiate the Arab Spring revolutions from past ones is the degree to which the political revolution triggers a social revolution wherein women have meaningful access to and representation in political institutions. Notwithstanding their increased participation in the public sphere as workers, women’s interests have been woefully underrepresented in the political process. Thus, women’s participation in the formal workforce, albeit at disproportionately lower rates than men, should not be mistaken for political representation and equal treatment before the law.
Accordingly, those concerned with achieving substantive equality, as opposed to mere formal equality on paper, should focus on the following three key objectives: 1) amend election laws to increase the proportion of women represented in local, state, and national politics; 2) increase access to high level employment opportunities for women; and 3) reform public education curriculums to highlight the role of women in the revolutions and the various professions to counter perceptions of women’s inability or disinterest in roles outside of the home and to communicate to the youth how sustainable democracies depend on equal participation by women. In combination, these objectives increase the likelihood of a more equitable society wherein women are sufficiently empowered to minimize gender disparities and meaningfully contribute towards the nation’s progress.