Throughout the twentieth century, the treatment of religion in the social sciences had been heavily shaped by the premises of modernization theory. This theory was responsible for the development of two concepts—the secularization thesis and the traditional school of civil society—which deny any space for religious content and actors in the public and political spheres. Both concepts rely on the exceptional experience of the west and share deterministic, static and essentially pessimistic assumptions regarding the ability of religion and the state to mutually coexist in democratic settings. In view of the above Israel’s treatment of religion stands out. Israel challenged the premises of the secularization thesis and instead granted a significant official role to religious contents and actors in the state. Contrary to common beliefs, this research demonstrates that Israel’s policy resulted in mainly positive consequences and contributed to the stabilization of its democratic regime. Furthermore, Israel’s inclusive policy on religion proved successful in containing and isolating mounting religious challenges to the state in recent decades and in securing the stability of the democratic regime. Israel’s account reveals two important lessons about the nature of the state-religion relationship. First, it offers a dynamic and mutually constitutive perception of the relationship between the state and religion. Second, it advocates development of a case-sensitive approach toward religion, depending on specific social, historical, and cultural attributes. These lessons might prove highly relevant for post Arab spring societies in transition.

Using sources on everyday life of average citizens, the article shows that an Arab–Jewish hybrid identity already existed in Palestine in the late nineteenth century, prior to the introduction of Arab or Jewish national movements. Afterwards it competed with them over the loyalty of its original members. Arab–Jewish identity was part of Palestine’s modernizing order rather than its old one. It prevailed in joint neighborhoods, religious festivals, spoken languages, schools, and joint coffee shops. Unlike other Middle East Arab–Jewish communities, in Palestine it included both Ashkenazi Jews and a certain type of Zionist.

This article traces the development of antisemitism in the Arab world, outlining major clusters of the phenomenon—Islamic anti-Jewish motifs; classic Western antisemitic tropes; and major themes in Holocaust discourse. It also highlights Arab voices critical of Arab antisemitic discourse, bigotry, and incitement against Jews—a subject largely neglected in the scholarly literature thus far. As in other societies, Arab antisemitism is not a phenomenon that is isolated from other social and political trends, but is part and parcel of the ongoing debate between competing worldviews.