The 1990s witnessed a growing rapprochement in relations between Turkey and Israel, which in a decade’s time have become strained, reaching an all-time low with the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. This article aims to analyze the developments in relations between the two countries mainly in the 2000s. The domestic, regional, and international levels are examined, with special attention to the factors that led to the current state of strained relations between the two countries.

Justice and Development Party [JDP] governments’ policies towards Israel were informed by the priorities that the party’s power strategies entailed. In a stark contrast to the friendly policies in its first term in power, the JDP began to employ different discursive strategies based on an anti-Israeli rhetoric since 2009. Geared to bolster the party’s prestige at home and abroad, the new rhetoric seemed to have addressed to the changing priorities of the party leadership. However, the new strategies led to the emergence of a widening gap between the anti-Israeli rhetoric and subtle efforts that the JDP paid to maintain its relations with Israel. Revisiting the last 15 years, the article tries to answer the question as to how Turkey’s relations with Israel were adjusted to meet necessities of miscellaneous power strategies that the JDP leadership pursued.

The Mavi Marmara tragic affair is viewed in Israel as part of a Turkish political maneuvering which gained momentum following the Arab Spring. According to this view Turkey under Prime Minister Erdogan has identified a vacuum created by the US phased withdrawal from the region, a decline in Egypt’s traditional role and the growing European and American need for Turkey’s involvement. In these circumstances, Turkey can assert itself as a regional power with domestic, regional and international political and economic returns. Championing the Palestinian cause and criticizing Israel bears hardly any price tag. Israelis and, especially, those who decide whether to accept Turkey’s demand for ending the Mavi Marmara affair and restoring normal relations, question whether this is Turkey’s strategy. The Arab Spring may produce major changes in the region’s political map that would also affect Turkey and Israel. This is a time when a dialogue, rather than rupture and confrontation, would better serve their long term interests. Yet both governments are now entrenched in their positions. This calls for a non-governmental initiative to prevent further deterioration and search for a process to heal the relationship.

The United Arab Emirates is one of the leading countries in the Middle East in terms of active foreign policy. One of the most striking instruments of Emirate’s active foreign policy is the establishment of military bases abroad, which are located notably in the Horn of Africa. These bases are considered a sign of the UAE’s increasing military activities and its willingness to use hard power. This study, therefore, aims to make sense of why the Emirati leadership has pursued such an aggressive foreign policy that involves the use of military capacities. While the study focuses on understanding the foreign policy dynamics of the UAE, it also aims to analyze the real motivations behind the Emirati leadership’s decision to establish military bases.

On the night of the July 15th coup attempt in Turkey both social and conventinoal media played important roles. Rather than inspiring and directing people, the Turkish media was used as a tool for communicating, motivating and disseminating reliable information throughout the world. This commentary aims to identify the media and military relations that characterized the July 15 case by examining the experience of the media outlets, the use of the media outlets they appealed to, as well as presenting an analysis of the media’s prevalent role in the history of Turkish coups.

Egypt under President Abdel Fatteh el-Sisi appears committed to avoid falling into the contentious Sunni-Shia divide by reconfiguring its security considerations based on the recognition of new circumstances that prioritize stability above sectarian and ethnic identity concerns. While Egypt is unlikely to fundamentally alter its foreign policy anytime soon, largely due to its economic dependency on rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, its recalibration of relations with Iran has assumed a new level of importance. The growing threat of violent extremism to destabilize the regional order and state-system is undermining old political alliances. This paper provides a systematic attempt to examine the prospects of Egypt’s foreign policy changes and their regional implications, particularly for its economic dependency on Saudi Arabia.