Uncertainty about the state of the new global order and the dynamics that govern it permeate academic literature and policy inquiries. In this new world order “picking allies, making friends and containing adversaries […] promises to be an unclear, ambiguous and delicate process.” Using Brazil and Turkey as an example, this paper aims to understand how and why emerging countries choose to “partner up.” The paper focuses on the growing relations between the two countries in the areas of political and economic cooperation between 2008 and 2012. The theoretical proposal of the paper is to test whether realist or more constructivist explanations can account for the approximation of these seemingly unlikely partners. This is done by examining the ideas and interests behind the moves towards stronger bilateral ties between the two states.

Far from taking place in a vacuum, in Morocco the 2011 constitutional revision was assessed both from an internal political perspective and within the broader context of what has come to be called the ‘Arab Spring’. In this manner, the 2011 Moroccan Constitution has indeed marked an unprecedented change, declaring the State’s adherence to the protection of human rights, which are strictly related to the Western history of ‘secular constitutionalism’. Yet, in order to better understand the constitutional transition, one has to consider the religious characteristic of Moroccan monarchy which, on the other hand, makes it a prototype of a ‘globalizing monarchy’, especially within the context of MENA (Middle East and Nord African) region. The Moroccan constitutional transition can in fact be seen as a peculiar tool for taking into account endogenous and exogenous factors respectively. On the one hand, it allows us to investigate how an Islamic specific legal tradition interacts with some principles that represent the pillars of constitutional democracies and that, as such, have been universally recognised; at least in the West. On the other, the exceptionalism of ‘Moroccan spring’ lets us to evaluate how these very principles are contextualized in a peculiar context of MENA region; by which, for the same reasons, one can draw more general considerations concerning the relationship between the pressing process of globalization and post-colonial Muslim-majority States.

The revolutions of the Arab Spring, in contrast to the liberal third wave of the 1970s to 1990s, rest on a more popular and traditionalist base. Critics often depict these currents as insular and even xenophobic in outlook. This article engages the literature on democratisation, framing, and social movement globalisation, and challenges that assumption. It draws on in-depth interviews conducted with Islamists and other activists in Cairo during April and May 2012. It argues that the pressures of globalisation and the opportunities of democratic transition are forcing traditionalists on to more cosmopolitan terrain. These cosmopolitan traditionalist activists draw on inspiration from other parts of the world and express solidarity with revolutionary movements elsewhere. Unlike liberal cosmopolitans, however, they ground their mode of tolerance and cooperation on substantive traditional values. While the pressures of globalisation may limit the ability of post-revolutionary regimes to deliver on social aspirations, this shift of ideological framing may pave the way for new traditionalist networks that cut across borders. As global political opportunity structures emerge and frustrations build up within nation-states, this cosmopolitan traditionalist bloc is likely to have the numbers and influence to reshape world order.

In a time when our globalizing world is confronted by a deepening global turmoil, political instability and multiplying security threats have set in motion a global tectonic shift. Turkey is not immune from these challenges; on the contrary, with its pivotal state/regional leadership position, its foreign policy choices will shape the effectiveness of any international effort for enduring peace and stability in the region. While Turkey’s proactive mode of operation since 2002 has remained, its vision, identity, and strategy have gained new characteristics. Over the last two years we have witnessed not only a reset, but the emergence of a new Turkish foreign policy whose proactive nature and main principles are shaped by what I call ‘moral realism,’ that combines hard power-based military assertiveness and humanitarian norms in addition to new capacity- and strategy-based parameters.