This article examines the rarely talked about subtleties of Moroccan reform in the realm of women’s rights and its inadequate fulfillment of obligations to international human rights standards. The Preamble to Morocco’s post-Arab Spring 2011 constitution follows the example of its 1996 version, in which the state declared its “determination to abide by the universally recognised human rights.” However, while the state is often hailed in the international forums and media as a true trendsetter in the realm of women’s rights in the Middle East and North Africa region, this analysis of the much celebrated Family Code and its two main goals-“doing justice to women” and “preserving men’s dignity”-and of the regime’s ambivalent discourse on gender equality as defined by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) paints a more realistic picture. Both of these cases indicate that the state is failing to ameliorate the legal position of women and to consider women as autonomous and individual human beings with intrinsic rights not contingent upon first fulfilling their customary obligations. I contend, therefore, that the way the reformed Family Code has formulated its goals and the way that the law and the state continue to conceptualize a woman go against the main principle of individuality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and CEDAW to which Morocco has continually committed itself, at least on paper.
The story of the ‘Arab Spring’ as a revolt of young people against autocratic rule and to bring democracy to their countries is not a good fit to the available data. Younger people were indeed over-represented in comparison to the age distribution of the population as a whole, but some of those ‘identified’ as young were in fact well into middle age, in no country were a majority of the protestors younger than 35, and the introduction of procedural democracy was not the only or even the main aim of the Uprisings. There is little evidence for the ‘rising tide’ in MENA which has been expected to sweep away autocratic rule in favour of democratisation as successive younger generations became individualised, liberalised and secularised. There is partial evidence for secularisation but little for the radical change in liberal values and the growth of rights-based politics. (For the latter we take attitudes to gender equality and gendered norms as our case study.) The neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’ which MENA countries have been urged to adopt has failed to provide a basis for such a normative change, failing either to generate the jobs which would have turned the ‘youth bulge’ into an economic ‘youth dividend’ or to establish an independent middle class within which liberalisation of norms and values leads to the demand for democracy.