The Palestinian Authority’s application to become a full member state at the United Nations represents the latest stage in its “alternative peace strategy” born of the collapse of the U.S.-sponsored Oslo peace process. But—argues the author—the new strategy remains overly dependent on diplomacy and uncertain Palestinian allies like the European Union. If it is to achieve a balance of power for future negotiations more favorable to the Palestinians, however, it will need to be anchored in a greater national consensus at home and in the diaspora, and allied more closely to the emerging democratic forces in the region.

Since 2003 and the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkish diplomacy has moved from a conservative (or Realpolitik) doctrine of foreign policy (sovereignty and security as priorities, the doctrine of ‘balance of power’, the use of military force being possible in cases where other democracies would negotiate) to a more liberal policy (trade, including cultural goods, as a priority; negotiations with all the neighbours to meet the targets of the ‘Policy of Zero Problems with our Neighbors’; the use of cultural and/or religious proximity with certain countries to increase trade and influence). The Turkish case is interesting because the Realpolitik doctrine was implemented for decades by politicians and diplomats concerned with the idea of ‘modernization’, i.e. making Turkey a ‘normal’ European country with a ‘normal’ foreign policy according to the dominant Western European conception of international relations. How far is such a move to a different doctrine possible? Under which conditions is it possible? What could the consequences be, and what kind of consequences would be acceptable? What could the internal and external purposes be in fine? ‘National issues’ such as Turkey’s rivalry with Greece on the Aegean, the Cypriot and Kurdish questions obviously slow down the transition because of the internal resistance from the military, the diplomats, and the political parties (in power or in opposition). External factors such as the hostility to the Turkish candidacy for EU membership in the West European political elite and public opinion, the Arab revolutions or the Iranian nuclear crisis forced the AKP government to adapt, to adjust and to take risks it was not ready to take at the beginning of the process.

Turkey’s ruling party, AKP, has used foreign policy as one of its primary instruments for consolidating domestic political support and monopolizing power in the hands of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Defiance of Western hegemony and references to the imperial Ottoman past have helped to replace Kemalist narratives and to override growing social divides within the country. As a result, Erdoğan’s hold on power is strengthened, since the AKP’s political contestation has been almost exclusively limited to elections.

This essay examines the domestic and external roots of Turkey’s activism in the Middle East through the lens of role theory. Within this context, the essay falls into three sections. In the first part, the conceptual tools that are going to be used in decoding the roots of Turkish activism will be examined. The second section will discuss the national role conceptions of Turkish foreign policy elites for the Middle East, while the third section will examine the expectations of external actors about Turkey’s role in the region. In the empirical sections of the essay, the methodology will involve a close examination of both Turkish foreign policy elites’ and external actors’ speeches, which are assumed to deliver cues about Turkey’s role conceptions in the Middle East.

This article explores the strategic importance Turkey holds to the European Union and how Ankara could contribute to the EU’s achieving the status of a veritable global power. It seeks to understand how the often contradictory threads (democratization vs. creeping authoritarianism) in the recent transformation of Turkish domestic politics affects its European credentials. The main argument of the paper is that it is in the core interest of both parties to align their policies in the neighboring regions, namely the Balkans, Caucasus, and the Middle East, especially in the post Arab Spring era. What hinders the genuine EU-Turkey partnership is often the political and tactical short-sightedness of both parties rather than the factual divergence of strategic interests.

This paper discusses EU-Turkey relations with a specific reference to regional developments in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. In the last decade, the Turkish government has tried to intensify Turkey’s influence in the region. However, increasing activism in Turkey’s foreign policy toward the region was not accompanied by a parallel commitment in its relations with the EU. In the meantime, the EU was caught unprepared by the Arab Spring in the middle of the Euro-zone crisis, and now its strategic interests are being threatened by regional instability. Both sides have been faced with the task of adapting their policies to the political transitions in the region. After an analysis of their contemporary regional policies, this article argues that even though their strategies are not totally in line with each other, Turkey follows the same objectives that the EU neighborhood policy has pursued towards the Middle East.