With the end of the Cold War, analysts advanced competing expectations about the likely character of the post-Cold War Order. Many expected a far-reaching transformation in the fundamental character of world politics. Some of these predictions were quite optimistic (especially by Liberals and Constructivists in International Relations theory) — believing the changes will lead to more peace and cooperation. Some, however, were Pessimists — predicting the emergence of new types of conflicts (for example, Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations”; and Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming Anarchy”), while others (the Realists in IR theory) remained skeptic regarding the possible transformation (for better or worse) in the fundamental character of international politics, even if taking into account specific changes in the global distribution of capabilities as leading to some important changes in the dynamics of the international system — whether in the direction of a benign hegemon or balance of power politics.
The paper will investigate the effects of the “Arab Spring” on security and cooperation in the Middle East according to these competing theoretical perspectives. The paper will then evaluate the explanatory and predictive power of the perspectives.
The Optimists underline the positive effects of the liberalization processes in the Arab world on rising prospects for cooperation both inside the Middle East as well as between the democratizing region with the democratic powers based on the pacifying and cooperative effects of liberal mechanisms such as the “democratic peace,” international institutions and the rising economic interdependence with the West and inside the region. The Skeptics (The Realists) minimize the importance of the domestic changes on foreign policy and international outcomes. According to them the key patterns will continue to be around the formation of regional balances of power and struggles over hegemony both inside the Middle East, and among the external powers involved in the region. The Pessimists will focus especially on the danger of the emergence of failed states as a result of the “Arab Revolt” and the spread of civil wars and foreign intervention. The “Clash of Civilizations” will highlight the cultural/religious constraints on the rise of liberal democracy in Arab/Muslim societies.
I argue that the combined effect of two factors — state strength and national congruence — is the most important for assessing the predictive power of the competing approaches. The two key factors are state strength — the effectiveness of the functioning of state institutions; and national congruence — the extent of congruence between geo-political boundaries and national aspirations and identities in the state. States, which are strong and nationally coherent, will tend to meet the Optimists’ predictions and will be good candidates for successful democratization and for the pacifying effects of liberalization. States which are both weak and incongruent — will follow the Pessimists’ predictions and will tend to be failed states with civil wars and foreign intervention; while strong states but incongruent will tend to produce a revisionist model and pose a potential threat to their neighbors. Finally, the instability prevalent in failed states can be mitigated by the intervention of a benign hegemon in the Middle East, but in highly fragmented regions such interventions might face a lot of problems and have some de-stabilizing effects.
There were large differences in the responses of Arab dictators to the Arab Spring protests. To understand these differences, I present a stylized model of how a dictator responds to mass protests for democratization in a polarized country with two ethnic or religious groups. In this model, the dictator’s response crucially depends on oil revenues and his affiliation to either the majority or the minority group. I document that the model’s predictions are consistent with the observed differences in the Arab dictators’ responses. Hence, ethnic politics and religious divides may play an important role in political transitions and regime changes.
The Arab monarchies remain relatively stable, largely unaffected by the ‘Arab Spring’ upheavals. In particular, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has emerged relatively unscathed from the region’s uprisings. The Jordanian case helps underscore the extent to which the polarization between Palestinian-Jordanians and native Jordanians continues to dominate the nature of public debate and political reform. While initially the ‘Arab Spring’ generated a spirit of cooperation between these two communities with calls to tackle unemployment culminating in demands for democratization, the persisting schism between them resurfaced when public debates on electoral law commenced. This article analyses the roots and ramifications of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Jordan, as well as the resilience of the kingdom to the nascent social upheavals.
This book investigates an important phenomenon in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region, namely the role that the military plays in the governments of several states of the region. Can military forces be defined as guardians of a regime in a democratic state? How is it possible to limit the power of armies to solely military prerogatives and competences? How can the intervention of military forces in the political arena in democratising countries be prevented? It is easy to ask these questions, but finding answers is more difficult. Using historical events and theories as examples to follow is an even more complicated task. What happened after the Arab Spring has demonstrated again how civil-military relations constitute an important pillar of the democratisation process.
We argue in this paper that the Arab Spring has opened a window of opportunity not just to create stability and democracy in one of the most unstable regions of the world, but also for revitalizing Turkey-EU relations. In theory, Turkey-EU cooperation can make a decisive difference in determining the outcome of the triangular relationship between stability, development, and democratization in the Arab region. In normative terms, as an opportunity, it must be turned into an advantage. From a practical perspective, however, transforming the window of opportunity into policy output is linked to the policy leadership of the sides involved to undergo a paradigm shift in their approach to the region and toward one another.
The literature on economic determinants of democratization has identified most importantly the effects of economic development and income distribution. In this regard, Egypt had exhibited higher average incomes and declining inequality between 1999 and 2012. However, by 2015, the level of income inequality had reverted near its level in 2008. Although income distribution data are not available for later years, trends in the composition of economic activity suggest that income inequality has likely continued to increase, disempowering the middle class further and contributing to de-democratization. A main puzzle during the build-up to the Arab Spring revolts of 2010-11 was the fact that income inequality in Tunisia and Egypt was relatively low in comparison to countries at similar stages of economic development. Especially for Egypt, this analysis had ignored the vast between-country and within-oil-exporting-country income inequalities, which, according to WID.world scholars’ calculations, had rendered the Middle East the most unequal region in the world. Post-2011 trends have simultaneously integrated Egypt more closely with Gulf economies and transformed the Egyptian economy more closely to follow the investment patterns of the latter. Thus, the short-lived economic trends that fueled demands for democratization in Egypt have been reversed, underpinning the regression of her political system to resemble more closely those of her Gulf benefactors. Although large investments in infrastructure may potentially lead to enhanced productivity and economic re-empowerment of the middle class, past experiences of Gulf economies to which the Egyptian economy is converging suggest otherwise.
The article contends that the “Arab Spring” needs to be analyzed through three analytical frameworks – democratization, authoritarian adaptation/succession, and state-failure – and that all three are unfolding simultaneously in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
The history of democratisation in Egypt could as best be dated back to 1970s. But little democratic progress was achieved in Sadat’s and Mubarak’s tenure until the Arap Spring. There are many handicaps before democratisation in Egypt: the elite’s stake in the authoritarian rule, widespread political extremism, structural problems within the political culture of the country in terms of democracy etc. This article ultimately argues that Egyptian democratisation process seems to be a painful and bloody process, but in the long term after the Arab Spring, the clock is ticking in favour of democracy.
The “Arab Spring” of 2010-2011 demonstrated that authoritarian collapse does not guarantee a transition to democracy. After revolutions, newly elected governments face a dilemma: they must rely on existing security institutions to restore order and stability, but they also must reform these potentially counterrevolutionary forces. In addition, these governments are now responsible to newly enfranchised populations. This paper offers a tradeoff hypothesis to explain the success or failure of transitional reforms, and points to elites’ framing of public debates as a primary factor leading public opinion, which either demands or neglects difficult reforms during moments of transition. The theory is tested with an original survey of Tunisian adults conducted in January 2017. An embedded vignette experiment asks respondents to adjudicate between investments in security sector reform versus economic or political reform, the exact types of tradeoffs countries face during the transition from authoritarian rule. An additional treatment tests whether citizens perceive a tradeoff between providing national security – i.e. against terrorist threats – and reforming the military to protect civil liberties, a question that has been debated since Tunisia’s 2011 uprising. I find that public opinion can be swayed by the framing of tradeoffs. Economic development is strongly preferred over other reforms. This finding has important implications for the success of both security sector reform and democratic consolidation.