Throughout the twentieth century, the treatment of religion in the social sciences had been heavily shaped by the premises of modernization theory. This theory was responsible for the development of two concepts—the secularization thesis and the traditional school of civil society—which deny any space for religious content and actors in the public and political spheres. Both concepts rely on the exceptional experience of the west and share deterministic, static and essentially pessimistic assumptions regarding the ability of religion and the state to mutually coexist in democratic settings. In view of the above Israel’s treatment of religion stands out. Israel challenged the premises of the secularization thesis and instead granted a significant official role to religious contents and actors in the state. Contrary to common beliefs, this research demonstrates that Israel’s policy resulted in mainly positive consequences and contributed to the stabilization of its democratic regime. Furthermore, Israel’s inclusive policy on religion proved successful in containing and isolating mounting religious challenges to the state in recent decades and in securing the stability of the democratic regime. Israel’s account reveals two important lessons about the nature of the state-religion relationship. First, it offers a dynamic and mutually constitutive perception of the relationship between the state and religion. Second, it advocates development of a case-sensitive approach toward religion, depending on specific social, historical, and cultural attributes. These lessons might prove highly relevant for post Arab spring societies in transition.

This article asks whether there are lessons that can be drawn from the democratization of Iraq for the possible democratization of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the wake of the 2010–2011 Arab uprisings. The paper draws on the democratization program in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 to demonstrate that focusing on the promotion of a liberal democratic model in Iraq translated into a lack of operational flexibility, which let democracy assistance unable to cope with socio-economic demands, local realities and reactions to democratization. Taking into account a variation in the intensity of interventionism between Iraq and MENA, the article argues that there is sufficient similarities between both cases to point Western democracy promoters in the direction of models of democracy that offer a more comprehensive response to the current political transition in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya than the traditional focus on the promotion of liberal democracy does.

Western and international democratization projects in the Arab world, as elsewhere, have been controversial mainly because, unlike traditional foreign aid through government-to-government channels that strengthened executive institutions, projects in the fields of elections, rule of law, and civil society are funded and executed principally through extra-governmental channels. While foreign democracy brokers successfully cultivated relationships with some liberal think-tanks and other institutions during the 1990s, there was also a political backlash as Arab governments attempted to restore their monopolies over foreign funding and the production of political information.

Throughout the first seven months of the Arab Spring, starting with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, the EU clearly revealed itself as both an actor and spectator by resorting to both activism and passivism in a seemingly erratic fashion. Against this background and based on the EU’s recently adopted Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, this article aims at understanding this dualism more precisely and shedding some light on the EU’s rather anachronistic foreign policy behavior in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in recent months. The article identifies five dichotomies, all of which contribute to the situation in which the EU continues to be torn between being a relevant political actor in the MENA region and a simple spectator that continues to be overwhelmed by local and regional political developments.

Starting from an analysis of the main features of the EU’s existing Mediterranean policies and specifically of the European Neighborhood Policy and the problems concerning its implementation, this article analyses the proposals for the revision of the ENP and the launch of a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean countries. It argues that while it is too early to judge whether the EU and its member states will be able to help the Southern Mediterranean countries change their political and economic systems and consolidate their democracies, two outcomes of the new approach already seem well defined: first, the unequal balance between the Eastern and the Southern dimension of the ENP seems to be have been redressed. Second, the pendulum of the EU’s Mediterranean policy has again swung towards bilateralism at the expense of multilateralism, and this approach is likely to continue if one considers the increasing heterogeneity of the countries in the region and the difficulty of conceiving of the Southern Mediterranean as an integrated space.

This paper explores the role of communications technology in the U.S.-Cuban relationship. It argues that the idea that anti-government dissidents will use the Internet, cell phones, and social media to foment a popular uprising on the island, modelled after the ‘Arab Spring’ is flawed because it fails to take into account the uniqueness of the Cuban situation. The paper then explores how it has become possible for this idea to have gained such traction in certain discourses in the United States. In doing so, the paper considers the history of paternalism and imperial hubris that has dominated U.S. policy toward Cuba, with an emphasis on the relationship during the Castro era. The paper demonstrates that current U.S. policy rests on fallacious assumptions about Cuba, the Cuban state and the relationship between the Cuban state and the Cuban people. The belief in a ‘Cuban Spring’ and in the idea that the United States could engender revolution in Cuba via communications technology is part of this larger narrative.

The Arab revolts have resulted in deposed heads of state in Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. Of these countries the latter two—Egypt and Tunisia—saw mass street protestors quickly topple entrenched autocrats without significant violence or foreign intervention. One year on, Egypt is still ruled by elements of the Mubarak regime with vested interests in the former order. It is also racked by political battles and economic troubles that are threatening its transition. Tunisia, on the other hand, is moving steadily closer toward a potential democratic consolidation. What explains the differences? This commentary discusses the prior institutional characteristics of the two countries. It then examines three areas of early transitional choices that contributed to Tunisia’s progress and undermined Egypt’s. In identifying lessons learned it makes the case that oppositional movements should avoid constitutional and institutional vacuums, establish broadly representative civilian-led transitional planning mechanisms, and follow appropriately-timed, transparent electoral sequencing.