Bahrain was among the first Arab Spring countries in which mass protests arose in February 2011. The authoritarian monarchy, which excludes vast segments of society from fair political and economic participation, opted for the use of force to suppress the mainly peaceful demonstrations, but it could not expunge the protests by a popular movement that continues to exist to this day. The power struggle is occurring along a Sunna-Shia divide that interconnects with regional sectarian tensions. This article investigates power-sharing arrangements as an option to deal with such deep divisions. It outlines the historical background of the sectarian tensions in Bahrain and the rudimentary forms of power-sharing that have existed there in the past. It then analyses the current debate between the regime and the opposition regarding the distribution of political power. While the reality still seems to be far removed from a power-sharing solution, we nevertheless recommend power-sharing as a feasible way out of the current stalemate.
This paper will discuss the political and social climate in Bahrain one year after the Arab Spring came to the country on February 14, 2011. The paper is divided into three main parts in order to give background and context. First, the paper will discuss the various iterations of inequality in Bahrain. Second, the governmental and international responses to the 2011 unrest and government crackdown on protests will be discussed. Lastly, a discussion will intend to tie the themes running throughout the paper together and discuss the future of Bahrain.
In this paper, we provide an overview of transitional justice in Tunisia, Egypt, and Bahrain. We begin each section with a brief overview of the violence and repression that gave rise to transitional justice demands. Then, we outline transitional justice processes to date, offering some preliminary conclusions on their strengths and weaknesses. We conclude by examining some of the factors shaping transitional justice in each country and offer some thoughts on the likely future course of transitional justice.
Richard Albert wants to know what happened to our commitment to the democratic revolution, and I share his frustrations and his befuddlement. Indeed, I might phrase the question more broadly than he has, and ask precisely what has become of our commitment to democratic rule, however brought about. Contemporary events in the Arab world leave one more confused than ever as to America’s understanding of its own role in supporting democratic orders. This is a matter that deserves more attention than it has been receiving. I consider Professor Albert’s contribution important, and helpful in advancing the discussion in a positive direction. I only hope in these few pages to expound upon the ideas he has presented, and extend them into directions which he may not have anticipated, indeed which he might disclaim, but which must command greater consideration. In particular, I want to explore a central irony in our times concerning the externally imposed democratic revolution.
This article purports to examine the role of the United States in the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the course of its subsequent paths. The main argument of this article is that the Arab Spring represented a major strategic surprise to the United States. It did not plan or facilitate the Arab Spring as the Tunisian, Egyptian, Yemeni and Bahraini regimes were performing to the best satisfaction of American interests in the Arab world. As the Arab Spring carried with it threats to American regional interests, the United States moved to secure its interests by steering Arab uprisings towards courses of action which best suit these interests.