Big Bata
Does social media reflect meaningful political competition over foreign policy? If so, what relationships can it reveal, and what are the limitations of its usage as data for scholars? These questions are of interest to both scholars and policymakers alike, as social media, and the data derived from it, play an increasingly important role in politics. The current study uses social media data to examine how foreign policy discussions about Israel–Iran are structured across different languages (English, Farsi, and Arabic) – a particularly contentious foreign policy issue. We use follower relationships on Twitter to build a map of the different networks of foreign policy discussions around Iran and Israel, along with data from the Iranian and Arabic blogosphere. Using social network analysis, we show that some foreign policy networks (English and Farsi Twitter networks) accurately reflect policy positions and salient cleavages (online behavior maps onto offline behavior). Others (Hebrew Twitter network) do not. We also show that there are significant differences in salience across languages (Farsi and Arabic). Our analysis accomplishes two things. First, we show how scholars can use social media data and network analysis to make meaningful inferences about foreign policy issues. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we also outline pitfalls and incorrect inferences that may result if scholars are not careful in their application.
The use of violent coercion to repress unarmed protests, such as that seen during the Arab Spring, sometimes backfires on the government – an outcome called ‘political jiu-jitsu’. Examining unique global data covering extreme violence used by governments against unarmed protests from 1989 to 2011 (drawn from UCDP) and the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data, this study aims to explain the conditions under which this outcome occurs. This study contributes to both the nonviolent action and one-sided violence literatures by further disaggregating this effect into both domestic and international outcomes, a distinction that has not previously been made in empirical studies. We find evidence that a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and security defections after violent repression, but is unrelated to international backlash. Within ongoing NAVCO campaigns we find that parallel media institutions increase the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and international repercussions after repression, and that this effect holds true for both traditional media and ‘new’ (i.e. internet-based) media. One of the novel contributions of this study is that we identify an important selection effect in the NAVCO data and the critical role of organizational infrastructure, especially communications infrastructure, in generating preference changes that create the conditions where killing unarmed civilians becomes costly for repressive governments. We conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of this study and avenues for future research.
What is the effect of religiosity on public opinion? Islamist religiosity in particular has been linked to a variety of outcomes, including authoritarianism and violence. Nevertheless, many scholars have countered that there is in fact no relationship between religiosity in the Arab world and adverse political outcomes. Thus the debate remains unresolved to some degree. To adjudicate this debate, we use the Arab Opinion Index’s 2016 data to examine the effect of individual religiosity on public opinion and political behavior. We find that there is no link between increased religiosity and negative views of democracy; in fact, the opposite is the case. There is also no link between religiosity and political participation. Finally, there is a positive correlation between religiosity and political tolerance.
This paper explores the impact of political instability on firms in the context of Tunisia, which experienced a surge in political instability events after the 2011 Jasmine revolution. Using a new dataset, we show that political instability was a major concern for small and exporting firms as well as those that were operating in the tourism sector, those that suffered from acts of vandalism or arson, and those that were located in the interior region of Tunisia. More importantly, we find strong evidence that political instability was the most damaging constraint to firm growth in Tunisia after the Arab Spring.
Commentators covering recent social movements, such as the Arab Spring, have claimed that cell phones and social media enable collective action. We develop a theoretical model to illustrate why, focusing on two mechanisms: first, by enabling communication among would-be protesters, cell phones lower the costs of coordination; second, these technologies broadcast information about whether a protest is repressed. Knowing that a large audience will now witness, and may be enraged by repression, governments refrain from squashing demonstrators, lowering the cost of protesting. We evaluate the model’s predictions using high-resolution global data on the expansion of cell phone coverage and the incidence of protest from 2007-2014. Our difference-in-differences estimates indicate that cell phone coverage increases the probability of protest by two times the mean. Consistent with our second mechanism, we also find that the expansion of coverage reduces the probability of repression.
Using the Arab Barometer Wave I – IV data from 2007 to 2016, I measure pre- and post-Arab Spring attitudes towards democracy among Quran readers, the group most likely to form their attitudes towards democracy based on their interpretation of the holy manuscripts. After the Arab Spring, Quran readers became more likely to cite support for democracy than those who rarely read the Quran. Furthermore, those who read the Quran frequently are more likely to: a) participate in politics; b) support for gender equality; c) be tolerant to outgroup members; and d) believe that freedom of speech is one of the most important characteristics of democracy. The reason Quran readers become supportive of democracy after the Arab Spring, I argue, is related to the rise of Islamist parties and movements becoming an architecture of political environments in their countries after the Arab Spring. I find that Quran readers are more likely to support democracy if they support political Islam.
Irregular migration became an alarming issue over the last decade for both developed and developing countries. A prevailing assumption in migration policy is that labor market and institutional characteristics play a crucial role in pushing people to leave their home countries in search for better life prospects. This paper examines this hypothesis using a unique dataset covering young people aged 15 to 29 from five major MENA countries from the year 2016. Using a probit model, the paper finds that labor market drivers (unemployment, job sector, social security, contract type) are of great importance for the decision to migrate irregularly amongst the youth in the MENA region and that the quality of institutions matters. In addition, the lack of wealth and economic opportunities enhance their willingness to engage in irregular migration.
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between corruption, political instability and economic growth. We first show how these variables interact by allowing for bidirectional causality between each two of the three variables for which we employ a panel VAR model on a dataset of 140 countries over the period of 1990-2017. Then, we exploit the incidence of the Arab Spring, as an exogenous shock, to measure the short-term effects of political shocks on corruption levels, political stability and economic growth using the differences-in-differences (DiD) framework.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants of ownership concentration in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The study highlights the importance of three main factors in shaping ownership structure: country, industry, and firm level. Annual data was collected from 912 firms in eight MENA countries over a seven-year period (2008–2014). Our sample consists of 5,521 observations. Due to the longitudinal nature of data, the study uses a random effects regression model. Also, 2SLS is used to control the endogeneity issue between ownership concentration and firm performance. The study finds that both firm size and firm age have a significant, positive relationship with ownership concentration. However, regarding financial performance, only Tobin’s Q has an impact on ownership concentration, while the return on assets and the return on equity have no significant effects. Country-level factors, such as the rule of law index and corruption control, have a significant, negative relationship with ownership concentration. Moreover, the Arab Spring has a significant, negative influence on ownership concentration. This study is the first to investigate determinants of ownership concentration in the MENA region and the effects on ownership concentration by a significant political event: the Arab revolution, popularly known as the ArabSpring, a revolutionary wave that started at the end of 2010 to change the rule of local governments.