Authoritarian rulers face constant, structural threats to their survival (Schedler, forthcoming). To explain the downfall of authoritarian regimes, “transitologists” and students of authoritarian regimes focus on elite factionalism as the key destabilizing force. As the Arab Spring, the Colored Revolutions, and the fall of communism in 1989 suggest, however, aggrieved masses might pose an equally formidable threat to non-democratic regimes. But what do we know about mass uprisings, especially in authoritarian regimes? “Preference falsification” (Kuran 1991) and “structural opacity” (Schedler, forthcoming) make it difficult to predict their onset. Yet beyond this opacity in our research, it appears that we really do not know much about mass contestation in general. What explains the speed and extent of mass mobilization? How do the structures and (re)actions of authoritarian regimes influence the dynamics of mobilization? Critical Mass Theory (CMT) (Karklins and Petersen 1993, Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1994) as well as Social Movement Theory (SMT) (see, e.g. Benford and Snow 2000, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, McCarthy and Zald 1987, Rucht 2012, Tarrow 1998, and, for a more critical approach Beinin and Vairel 2011a, Goodwin and Jasper 1999, Kurzman 2004) provide some answers to these questions, especially when the findings of these two theoretical strands are combined.
Looking at the many occurrences of mass contestation since 1989, we assert that all of them had their distinct dynamics (see also: Plattner 2011, Way 2011). Most glaring, some mass uprisings were led by a distinct group of counter-elites (mainly the Colored Revolutions, bar Kyrgyzstan), whereas other uprisings did without a clear-cut leadership (the 1989 revolutions and the Arab Spring). Does leadership make a difference for dynamics of mass contestation? And do they make a difference for the (possible) outcomes of mass contestation? We address these two questions by looking at two cases of successful mass contestation: Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003 (with opposition leadership) and the Arab Spring in Egypt in 2011 (largely without opposition leadership). In addition to secondary sources, we conducted more than a dozen semi-structured interviews with opposition activists and participant observers in both countries during the summer of 2012.
This paper examines the learning of authoritarian regimes in the early phase of the Arab uprisings. Differentiating conceptually between learning and policy change, we analyze and compare the authoritarian regimes of Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, and Syria and their reactions to the challenge of “late riser” oppositional protests. We first show that the four regimes initiated very diverse measures in the domains of repression, material co-optation, and legal reforms. With regard to the sources of learning, we find that proximity is a determining factor, in terms of both geography and political similarity. Using the case of Bahrain, we then demonstrate that structural factors such as internal power structures, regional and international pressures, or state capacity can decisively constrain the implementation of learning-induced policy change. Overall, the paper aims to contribute to the emerging research on the international dimension of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and beyond.
Using data from the Arab Barometer, we assess the protest participation between 2005-08 in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen. We find protests were common during the years preceding the Arab Spring and the riskier form of protesting (marching in a demonstration) was approximately 1.5 to 2 times as common as the less risky form of protest (signing a petition), despite the dangers of voicing dissent in authoritarian regimes. We propose grievance and opportunity explanations of why people protested. We find support for economic grievance arguments connecting protest to income and corruption, but not to macro-economic policies. We find support for political grievance arguments connecting protest to exclusion from power and desire for democracy. We also find support for the argument that people are most likely to protest when they do not fear government reprisals. None of the arguments, however, have significant explanatory power in more than two of the four countries, suggesting that even in seemingly similar authoritarian regimes, people protest for different reasons. The propensity to seek a single explanation should be resisted.
The fate of regimes after the Arab Spring has prompted scholars to reconsider how authoritarian institutions affect mass protest. Why did Mubarak fall, but not King Mohammed VI of Morocco? Are the paths to regime change different in monarchies? This article argues that monarchies have a unique institutional feature that other authoritarian regimes lack: they can democratize without destabilizing the leadership by transitioning to a democratic constitutional monarchy. The promise of constitutional monarchy affects protestor demands and weakens mass mobilization for regime change. Kings do not survive protest waves because they are smarter, more legitimate, or more likely to institute meaningful reforms. Nor are they invulnerable; monarchies can and do crumble. But monarchs are less likely than other authoritarian rulers to be overthrown via mass protest. This article provides a theory of the differences between monarchies and other authoritarian regimes, drawing on cross-national studies and a case study of Morocco.
Drawing on both qualitative ethnographic fieldwork and experimental evidence from a survey using Facebook social networks, this paper examines collective action among first movers and their networks during the ArabSpring protests in Morocco. It finds that the regime’s efforts to police, suppress, and arrest political dissidents encouraged participation in or support for new protests. Specifically, the paper makes two arguments. First, it shows that activism is passed down from one generation to the next: the first movers in 2011 often came from families that suffered past human rights violations at the hands of the regime. A family history of repression increases a person’s willingness to engage in risky collective action. Second, it finds that repression during the Arab Spring was also counterproductive; information about the regime’s efforts to brutally police protests increased support for protest among first movers and their social networks. A regime that abuses its citizens’ human rights by jailing and attacking protestors creates incentives for its citizens to oppose it; these abuses can come back to haunt the regime long after repression occurs.