Systems Thinking Index of Works of Scholarship

In 2011, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) recorded 37 armed conflicts with a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths. This significant increase from the 31 conflicts recorded in 2010 was primarily driven by an increase in conflicts on the African continent, and is only in part due to events tied to the Arab Spring which mosdy led to other forms of violence than conventional armed conflict. The number of active conflicts still remains at a relatively low level compared to the peak years in the early 1990s, when more than 50 conflicts were active. The number of wars – conflicts leading to 1,000 or more batde-related deaths – increased to six; however, it is a considerably lower number than during the peak years of the early 1990s. For the second consecutive year, Afghanistan claimed the highest number of fatalities. Five armed conflicts listed for 2010 were not active in 2011, but during the year three new conflicts erupted – Libya, South Sudan and Sudan (Abyei) – and six conflicts already registered were restarted. Only one peace agreement was concluded during the year. Thus, the trend with low numbers of peace accords which started in 2009 continues.

This article argues that anti-Shi’ism is simply one component in a strategy to justify and enforce Egypt’s security policies and regional leadership goals. An examination of Egyptian press coverage of the 2009 discovery of a Hizbullah cell in Egypt illustrates a process through which Shi’ism is initially identified as a sectarian threat, but then “de-Arabized” through linkage with Iran. Despite being an Arab organization, Egyptian media portray Hizbullah as a non-Arab challenge to the Arab world’s stability, more than a Shi’i challenge to Sunnism or a security threat. This indicates that Egypt’s traditional foreign policy of defending Arab interests is more important than sectarianism in conceptualizing threats to its security.

The Arab Uprising is the consequence of the structural crisis of the rentier state engaged with a neo-liberal regime implemented by authoritarian rulers. The people have removed the authoritarian rulers but does that change the nature of the state and its preference for a neo-liberal regime?

The Middle East has become a key place in the battle to negotiate the role of women. Indeed, during the Arab Spring revolutions, women actively and publicly participated. This was a striking feature, as many of the countries in the region had and continue to actively regulate the private and public lives of women. As revolution gives way to transition, questions remain as to how these newfound realities will incorporate gender in the state-building and reintegration processes, as well as in economic development and the rule of law. Zainab Salbi, founder of Women for Women International, a grassroots development organization that has helped women globally access social and economic opportunities, shares with the Journal her reflections on the future. Having interviewed women activists over the past few months, Salbi explores the vital role of women activists in the revolutions, and argues that we cannot talk about the stability and future of these countries without recognizing the “Third Way” and the moderating and inclusive voices of these women.

Revisiting ‘the margins’ as an illuminating conceptual space analogous to, yet distinct from, the exception, this article explores the Arab Spring from its margins to highlight ‘silencing effects’ that, if they underpin the problematic notions of the Arab Spring and Arab exceptionalism, assume spectacular dimensions at the margins, namely, the ‘disappearance’ of an uprising. The disputed territory of Western Sahara, partially annexed by Morocco since 1975, saw an unprecedented uprising in October-November 2010. Annexed Western Sahara’s uprising narrowly preceded Tunisia’s, conventionally recognized as the first of the Arab Spring. Despite Sahrawis’ perceptions of similarities between their uprising and the Arab Spring, Western Sahara’s uprising is overlooked in most analyses of the Arab Spring. ‘Silencing effects’ obscure these similarities and, ultimately, the uprising itself.

In 2011, several months after a popular revolt overturned the Gaddafi regime in Libya, Libya’s new National Transitional Council announced the discovery of what was later confirmed to be an undeclared stockpile of chemical weapons. This was a startling announcement to many observers, since Libya had publicly renounced its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes in 2003 and had apparently dismantled the programmes soon after. Although the Libyan case had repeatedly been referred to as a positive ‘model’ for nonproliferation—an instance where a country had voluntarily and peacefully rolled back its WMD programs—this recent discovery forces us to wonder whether the Libyan ‘model’ really was as successful as initially described. This article examines the successes, challenges and lessons that can be learned from the Libyan case of WMD renunciation and verification. As one model of cooperative verification, the Libyan case highlights not only the opportunities afforded by monitoring and verification regimes, but also some of the difficulties that any such regime will encounter in real-world circumstances, however positive.

During the anti-regime uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, women from all walks of life were as ready as men to take to the streets to protest against the ineptitude and transgressions of their countries’ governments. Their courage was particularly noteworthy given that they suffered not only the violence of the regimes’ attempts to suppress protests by force, as did their male counterparts, but also a systematic targeting by security forces who attempted to break the women’s spirits through attacks on their honour and bodily integrity. The female presence and agency in the Arab Spring encouraged activists in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya to expect an equitable role for women in the political transition processes that followed the fall of the authoritarian regimes in those countries. However, the female input in those political transitions has been scant. Moreover, in all three countries, established women’s rights are increasingly under attack and violence against women is on the rise. This article applies a gendered perspective to explore the upheavals of the Arab Spring and the political transitions in the three countries, and inquires into the insecurities that women have suffered since early 2011.

Terrible rulers, sullen populations, a terrorist fringe—the Arabs’ exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral one. Then, a frustrated Tunisian fruit vendor summoned his fellows to a new history, and millions heeded his call. The third Arab awakening came in the nick of time, and it may still usher in freedom.

For many decades, the Arab despots would serve the Western interests in the region in return for a Western disregard to democracy policies in their countries. By the outbreak of the Arab uprisings in the Middle East, this implicit agreement between the West and the Arab despots was put in jeopardy. This article defines the challenges faced by the Western interests as a result of these revolts. Moreover, it digs deeper into the American and European reactions to the uprisings. Finally, the article contemplates the reasons behind the western behavior towards these revolts. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the implicit agreement is still possible in spite of the Arab uprising, albeit with a diverse formula.